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An Empirical Study of Certain Settlement-Related Motions 
for Vacatur in Patent Cases 
JEREMY W. BOCK* 
When parties jointly move to vacate otherwise proper rulings as part of a 
settlement agreement, district courts often oblige. While the general practice of 
vacating rulings to facilitate settlement has been criticized in the academic 
literature as depriving the public of the benefit of judicial precedents, there are 
hardly any empirical studies on the prevalence of this practice and its effects, 
particularly at the district court level where the efficiencies arising from 
settlement—and the resulting pressure on the court to grant vacatur—are much 
greater compared to the appellate level. This Article endeavors to add an empirical 
study to the literature on settlement-related vacatur, focusing on district courts in 
the specific context of patent litigation. In patent cases, the impact of vacating 
rulings on the public interest is most acute where the affected ruling pertains to the 
scope, validity, or enforceability of a patent because the cost of relitigating those 
issues—without the economy of collateral estoppel—may dissuade potential 
challenges to suspect patents or unmeritorious infringement claims. 
The empirical study analyzes a dataset of 79 patent cases in which settlement-
related motions for vacatur were filed over a five-year period (January 2006 to 
January 2011) that targeted certain rulings adverse to patentees. In those 79 cases, 
motions for vacatur were granted in 62 cases (78.5%), denied in 15 cases (19%), 
and withdrawn by the parties in 2 cases (2.5%). The data reveal that district courts 
appear to prioritize near-term docket management concerns when granting 
vacatur—even when it would undermine judicial economy and the public interest. 
Indeed, district courts routinely granted vacatur without providing a reasoned 
explanation, without regard to the litigation history of the patent or the 
litigiousness of the patentee, and with a degree of alacrity that would effectively 
prevent interested third parties from filing timely motions to intervene to oppose 
vacatur. Overall, the data suggest that granting settlement-related vacatur is a 
false economy: it leaves the judiciary vulnerable to manipulation, and burdens the 
public with the anticompetitive effects of weak patents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The practice of courts vacating1 otherwise proper rulings for no reason other 
than that the parties have requested it in connection with a settlement raises 
questions about the public nature of adjudication and the risk of strategic behavior 
by litigants.2 However, to the litigants who request such relief, and the courts that 
grant it, its virtue lies in its apparent efficiency in facilitating settlement to conserve 
both private and public resources. Are they right? Or, could the grant of vacatur be 
a false economy? This is a question over which opinions differ, even among 
eminent jurists.3 Yet, empirical studies of the prevalence and effects of settlement-
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Vacatur is “[t]he act of annulling or setting aside.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1688 
(9th ed. 2009). The verb form is “vacate,” which is defined as “[t]o nullify or cancel; make 
void; invalidate <the court vacated the judgment>.” Id. 
 2. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior 
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 593 (1991) 
(“[T]he effect of vacatur on the litigation process extends beyond judicial waste; it perverts 
the judicial decision into a negotiable commodity, engendering distortion of, and disrespect 
for, the role of the courts.”); see also Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of 
Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2004) (“[C]ourts have, in essence, ‘rediscovered’ the vacatur 
procedure . . . and have created something very different and potentially dangerous to law.”); 
Daniel Purcell, Comment, The Public Right to Precedent: A Theory and Rejection of 
Vacatur, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 867, 916 (1997) (“[A] litigant has no right to be free of a non-
defective adverse judgment.”). 
 3. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party 
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1227–28 (2000) (“According to 
Judge Winter of the Second Circuit, a decision not to vacate a judgment wastes both the 
litigants and the court’s resources by requiring the continuation of litigation that could have 
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related vacatur are scarce4 and focus primarily on appellate courts,5 which may not 
account for the specific characteristics of district courts,6 where the potential 
savings in judicial economy from settlement are far greater.7 
This Article analyzes the results of an empirical study on settlement-related 
vacatur at the district court level, focusing specifically on patent cases. Patent cases 
are well suited for detailed empirical investigations because of the availability of 
specialized databases—such as the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse (IPLC)8 
and Docket Navigator9—that allow the systematic searching and review of district 
court patent case dockets collected from PACER.10 
In addition, the potential for repetitive litigation makes patent cases a propitious 
vehicle for studying the conditions under which settlement-related vacatur is 
requested and granted. A patentee who files suit risks having the asserted patent 
narrowed in scope, invalidated, or held unenforceable. When confronted with an 
adverse ruling that could impair future assertions, licensing, or the overall valuation 
of the asserted patent, most patentees will eventually settle.11 To escape the 
consequences of an adverse ruling without further litigation, some patentees will 
                                                                                                                 
been settled. . . . By contrast, Judge Easterbrook, analyzing the same problem, came to the 
opposite conclusion.”). 
 4. Id. at 1229 (“[I]t is difficult to draw a firm conclusion about the efficacy of the 
vacatur practice in the absence of empirical evidence.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and 
Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033, 1073 n.221 
(1993) (empirical study of stipulated reversals in California appellate courts concluding that 
stipulated reversal is not an important factor in promoting settlement). 
 6. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. 
Martin, How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
83, 87 (2009) (“[I]n the relatively scant empirical literature on district courts, little attention 
has been paid to how their institutional features shape judges’ decision-making. Empirical 
studies of district courts have tended unreflectively to borrow models developed to study the 
appellate courts . . . .”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 418 
(1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges] (“[W]hat works for the courts of appeals 
cannot simply be transplanted into trial courts.”). 
 7. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994) 
(“[T]he judicial economies achieved by settlement at the district-court level are ordinarily 
much more extensive than those achieved by settlement on appeal.”). 
 8. Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, STAN. L. SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/
program/centers/iplc. The IPLC is presently operated by a private company, Lex Machina, Inc. in 
Palo Alto, California. (For more information on the company, see LEX MACHINA, 
https://lexmachina.com.) The dataset for the empirical study reported in this Article was compiled 
primarily through the IPLC. See infra Part III. 
 9. Docket Navigator is provided by Hopkins Bruce Publishers Corp., in Abilene, 
Texas. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, https://docketnavigator.com. 
 10. PACER, which is an acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, is an 
electronic service provided by the federal judiciary that allows users to obtain case 
information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts. PACER, 
http://www.pacer.gov. 
 11. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An 
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (empirical study of patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000, 
finding that “approximately 80% of patent cases settle”). 
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attempt to secure its nullification in the course of reaching a settlement. Because a 
vacated ruling has no preclusive or precedential force,12 this option is attractive to 
patentees who want to strip any potential collateral estoppel13 effect from an 
inconvenient ruling.14 To make vacatur more palatable to the district court, which 
likely invested considerable resources to produce the ruling targeted for vacatur, a 
patentee typically requests vacatur in an unopposed or joint motion with the 
accused infringer, who, in accordance with the settlement agreement, acquiesces in 
its filing.15 In some instances, a patentee may expressly condition the settlement on 
the grant of vacatur, such that a denial will void the settlement. Consistent with the 
judiciary’s strong preference for settlement,16 district courts granted vacatur in a 
clear majority of cases in the dataset (78.5%; 62 out of 79 cases)17 compiled for this 
Article. This is not surprising given that district judges are under pressure to 
manage their dockets efficiently and clear any backlogs,18 and so settlement is the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Vacatur “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and 
eliminates a judgment.” United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950); see also 
Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] vacated 
judgment has no preclusive force either as a matter of collateral or direct estoppel or as a 
matter of the law of the case.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, may bar relitigation of an issue 
if: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in a prior action; (2) the issue was actually 
litigated in the prior action; (3) the resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in 
the prior action; and (4) the party defending against issue preclusion had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 
319 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 14. Collateral estoppel may be used to establish: (1) invalidity, see, e.g., Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (holding that any subsequent 
defendant may reap benefit of prior invalidity decision under principles of collateral 
estoppel); (2) unenforceability, see, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 
170 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“An unrelated accused infringer may likewise take 
advantage of an unenforceability decision under the collateral estoppel doctrine.”); (3) 
noninfringement, see, e.g., Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 655 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement based on 
collateral estoppel); and (4) claim constructions, see, e.g., TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 
F. Supp. 2d 370, 375–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (according collateral estoppel effect to a claim 
construction order). 
 15. Throughout this Article, the term “motion” will refer to motions for vacatur that are 
jointly filed or unopposed, unless specified otherwise. 
 16. The judiciary’s preference for settlement is succinctly expressed in “the familiar 
axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.” In re Warner 
Comm’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Judith Resnik, 
Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for 
Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 159 (“[J]udges have put their institutional authority 
behind settlement as the mode of disposition to be preferred.”). 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, 
District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 705–06 (2007) (“[S]cholars have 
been insufficiently attendant to the shaming sanctions that judges face if they fall too far 
behind on their docket. In essence, Congress (through the Administrative Office) publishes a 
list naming judges whose dockets are too full. Such dilatory judges face the gentle ribbing of 
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preferred method for case disposal because it clears the docket without the risk of 
appeal and reversal.19 
However, the routine nullification of rulings affecting the scope, validity, or 
enforceability of a patent adversely affects the public interest,20 as it facilitates the 
reassertion of weak patents21 and undermines the finality of judgments.22 Once the 
unfavorable rulings associated with a patent have been vacated, the patentee can 
freely assert that patent against other potential defendants, who are confronted with 
the choice of relitigating the same issues at considerable expense23 or taking a 
license to a patent that might be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.24 
                                                                                                                 
their fellows at the judicial lunch table and the harsh glare of the media spotlight.”). 
 19. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, who often sits by designation at the 
trial court level, summarizes this dynamic as follows: 
 District judges often have heavy dockets; a single judge in an urban district 
will have several hundred cases pending before him. Most of these will be 
settled or abandoned without the judge’s intervention. But enough will remain 
that require court action to induce the judge to attend to them lest his backlog 
become unmanageable. He cannot be cavalier in disposing of these cases, as 
then his reversal rate would rise to an embarrassing level. So backlog pressure 
keeps him working hard and reversal threat keeps him working carefully—
though an alternative strategy is to push the parties to settle, since settlements 
reduce backlog without risk of reversal. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 141 (2008). 
 20. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 
(1971) (“‘A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. . . . The far-reaching 
social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount 
interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other 
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.’” 
(quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 
(1945))). 
 21. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 n.19 (1969) (noting “the public’s 
interest in the elimination of specious patents”). 
 22. See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993) (“[O]ur 
prior cases have identified a strong public interest in the finality of judgments in patent 
litigation.”). 
 23. In 2011, the median cost of patent litigation for cases having: (i) less than $1 million 
at risk was $650,000; (ii) $1-$25 million at risk was $2.5 million; and (iii) more than $25 
million at risk was $5 million. LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 
ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2011). 
 24. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 338 (“In each successive suit the patentee 
enjoys the statutory presumption of validity, and so may easily put the alleged infringer to 
his expensive proof. As a consequence, prospective defendants will often decide that paying 
royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the costly burden of challenging 
the patent.”). Experienced patent jurists at the district court level, such as Leonard Davis of 
the Eastern District of Texas and T.S. Ellis, III, of the Eastern District of Virginia, have 
expressed similar concerns about the distortion of patent litigation by its sheer cost. See, e.g., 
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5, Raylon LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, No. 6:09-
cv-00355-LED (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2011), ECF No. 147 (Davis, J.) (“[T]his Court has some 
concerns about plaintiffs who file cases with extremely weak infringement positions in order 
to settle for less than the cost of defense . . . . Such a practice is an abuse of the judicial 
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Furthermore, given the complex and highly contentious nature of patent litigation,25 
considerable judicial resources were likely spent adjudicating the vacated rulings, 
which may include claim construction orders, summary judgment rulings, and even 
jury verdicts.26 Despite the significant competing interests of the settling parties, 
the public, and the judiciary implicated by settlement-related motions for vacatur27 
in patent cases, there is not much guidance in the caselaw on when it may be 
appropriate for a district court to grant or deny them.28 
In the absence of clear precedent, empirical research may help bring into relief 
the various considerations—both public and private—for evaluating whether 
granting settlement-related vacatur may be appropriate in a particular case and to 
inform further doctrinal development.29 Timing-wise, an empirical study would be 
useful in light of certain trends and recent developments in the patent field that may 
prompt patentees to file settlement-related vacatur motions in more cases. First, the 
patent monetization trend is accelerating, whereby practicing companies, with their 
patent stockpiles, are increasingly adopting the tactics of—and, in some cases, 
selling their patents to and even teaming up with—patent assertion entities 
(PAEs)30 (colloquially known as “patent trolls”) to generate revenue through 
                                                                                                                 
system and threatens the integrity of and respect for the courts.”); T.S. Ellis, III, Distortion of 
Patent Economics by Litigation Costs, in 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: STREAMLINING 
INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 22, 23 (1999), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
casrip/symposium/Number5/pub5atcl3.pdf (“[B]urgeoning litigation costs have distorted 
patent markets by significantly discouraging potential patent challenges, hence distorting 
competition to a degree beyond that justified by the intrinsic strength or merit of the 
patent.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel 
Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 671, 682 (2004) (“Patent litigation is like the neurosurgery of litigation: it is hard 
scientifically and it is hard legally. Trial court judges kill themselves on a trial . . . . Every 
single issue is raised; every one is preserved.” (statement of Judge Patti Saris of the District 
of Massachusetts)). 
 26. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 27. See generally 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2863 (2d ed. 1995) (observing that when 
parties request vacatur in connection with settlement, “[t]he question involves a balancing of 
the desire to encourage voluntary settlements and reduce appeals with the public interest in 
preserving the judgment to enhance judicial economy by allowing it to be used for issue 
preclusion purposes and in avoiding the possibility that repeat litigants effectively may 
control the development of the law by erasing unfavorable judgments”). 
 28. See infra Part I. 
 29. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 393 (1986) 
(“[T]he federal courts have been an arena of massive experimentation in judicial 
administration. . . . Very few of these experiments have been conceived or evaluated in a 
scientific spirit and this may help explain why the federal courts remain in a state of crisis. 
Maybe a dose of social science is the thing, or one of the things, that the system needs.”). 
 30. Patent assertion entities (PAEs) are firms whose business model focuses on purchasing 
and asserting patents. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) 
[hereinafter Chien, Arms Race] (defining PAEs); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING 
IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011), 
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aggressive licensing campaigns backed by enforcement litigation.31 As a result, 
increasing numbers of patentees may seek vacatur of an adverse ruling that affects 
a patent with a prior history of successful licensing in order to maintain the flow of 
royalty payments. Second, the recently-enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
of 2011 restricts the joinder of defendants to those instances where there exist 
questions of fact common to all the defendants, and the alleged infringement arises 
out of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”32 
Accordingly, a patentee who intends to assert the same patent against multiple 
defendants will have a strong incentive to seek vacatur of any adverse rulings that 
may have preclusive effects in other suits. 
Against this backdrop, the empirical study presented in this Article explores the 
current practice relating to settlement-related vacatur in patent cases to determine 
how and to what extent the practice should be curtailed. To provide the necessary 
context for the presentation of the results and their implications, Part I provides an 
overview of the current legal framework under which settlement-related motions 
for vacatur are brought. Part II describes the design of the empirical study and 
provides a summary of the results. Part III explains the compilation of the dataset. 
Part IV analyzes the results from the dataset relating to the content, filing, and 
disposition of vacatur motions, as well as certain second-order effects on the public 
interest and judicial economy. Part V discusses further implications and provides 
recommendations for future doctrinal development. A brief conclusion summarizes 
the salient points. 
I. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
At the district court level, motions to vacate an otherwise proper ruling in order 
to facilitate settlement are typically brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) or 54(b), 
depending on the procedural posture of the case at the time of the motion. If the 
motion is filed after the entry of final judgment,33 a district court may consider it 
under Rule 60(b)(6), which empowers the court to grant relief from a final 
judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief”34 if “extraordinary 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf (using similar definition of 
PAEs). 
 31. Chien, Arms Race, supra note 30, at 342 (“A number of companies . . . have found it 
profitable to enforce, through licensing, their once defensive portfolios. Others, like General 
Electric, . . . sue companies in technology areas in which they do not practice. Practicing 
company patents, when sold on the market, can also end up being asserted by patent-
assertion entities.”). 
 32. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 333 
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299). 
 33. “A ‘final decision’ generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 
U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citation omitted). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). The grounds for relief from a final judgment under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 60(b) are: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under [FED. R. CIV. P.] 
59(b); 
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circumstances” exist.35 If the motion is filed prior to the entry of final judgment, a 
district court may consider it under Rule 54(b),36 which vests the court with 
inherent authority to modify or reconsider non-final or “interlocutory” orders.37 
Although the invocation of collateral estoppel generally requires a final judgment,38 
interlocutory orders may also be accorded collateral estoppel effect under certain 
circumstances,39 such that parties will often seek vacatur of non-final rulings out of 
                                                                                                                 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; 
(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on 
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 
prospectively is no longer equitable; or 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Of the six enumerated reasons, only the Rule 60(b)(6) “catch-all” 
could potentially accommodate a motion to vacate an otherwise proper ruling after the entry 
of final judgment. The other enumerated reasons in Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) relate to situations 
where the judgment is in some way defective or no longer appropriate, and thus warrant 
vacatur for reasons other than simply to facilitate settlement. 
 35. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863–64 (1988) 
(observing that Rule 60(b)(6) “does not particularize the factors that justify relief, but we 
have previously noted that it provides courts with authority adequate to enable them to 
vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice, while also 
cautioning that it should only be applied in ‘extraordinary circumstances’” (internal citations 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 
112, 118 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (observing that “the difference between Rule 60(b)(6) and Rules 
60(b)(1)-(5) is that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ are required to bring the [Rule 60(b)(6)] 
motion within the ‘other reason’ language of that Rule” (alteration in original) (internal 
quotations omitted) (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863 n.11)); see also 12 JAMES WM. MOORE, 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: CIVIL § 60.48 (Daniel R. Coquillette, Gregory P. Joseph, Sol 
Schreiber, Georgene M. Vairo & Chilton Davis Varner eds., 3d ed. 2012); 11 WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 27 at § 2864. 
 36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides, in pertinent part:  
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer 
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties 
does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised 
at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and 
all the parties’ rights and liabilities. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 37. An “interlocutory order” is “[a]n order that relates to some intermediate matter in 
the case; any order other than a final order.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (9th ed. 2009). 
 38. See supra note 13. 
 39. See, e.g., Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(applying Eleventh Circuit law in holding that partial summary judgment orders satisfied 
legal prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel). Whether a ruling is entitled to collateral 
estoppel effect is a procedural issue, such that a district court would apply the law of its 
regional circuit—rather than Federal Circuit law—in analyzing whether the doctrine is 
applicable in a given case. See Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“Because the application of collateral estoppel is not a matter within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of this court, this court applies the law of the circuit in which the district court 
sits . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). Some circuits have a stricter view of the finality 
requirement for collateral estoppel than others. Compare Golman v. Tesoro Drilling Corp., 
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an abundance of caution.40 Under either Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 54(b), the decision 
to vacate is committed to the discretion of the district court41 and is evaluated under 
the law of the regional circuit unless the motion implicates patent law, at which 
point Federal Circuit law applies.42 However, as explained below, the Federal 
Circuit has thus far provided scant—and possibly conflicting—guidance to the 
district courts on when settlement-related vacatur may be appropriate.43 
In general, the leading case on the subject is the Supreme Court’s 1994 opinion 
in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,44 a bankruptcy case 
that settled after the Supreme Court granted certiorari.45 In Bancorp, the Supreme 
Court denied the petitioner’s motion to vacate the judgment under review, holding 
that “[w]here mootness results from settlement . . . the losing party has voluntarily 
forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby 
surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”46 In characterizing 
vacatur as an “extraordinary remedy” to which “equitable entitlement” must be 
shown,47 the Court stressed that “mootness by reason of settlement does not justify 
vacatur” in the absence of “exceptional circumstances,” where “exceptional 
                                                                                                                 
700 F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 1983) (“An order granting partial summary judgment is 
interlocutory; it has no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.”), with Lummus Co. v. 
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) (“‘Finality’ . . . 
may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage 
that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.”). For this 
reason, Federal Circuit Judge Timothy Dyk has observed that the goal of uniformity in 
patent law may be better served by having the Federal Circuit apply its own rules on 
collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 294 F.3d 1330, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“There is simply no reason why an earlier patent 
judgment should have one consequence in the Third Circuit and another in the Seventh 
Circuit, for example. Such an approach encourages the very forum shopping that our 
regional circuit law approach was designed to prevent.”). 
 40. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
 41. See, e.g., 12 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 56.124[1] (“Courts have inherent power to 
reconsider interlocutory orders [under Rule 54(b)], including grants of partial summary 
judgment and denials of summary judgment.”); 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, at § 2857 
(“As is recognized in many cases, a motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) is 
addressed to the discretion of the court . . . .”). 
 42. Compare Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., 455 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“A district court’s denial of a motion under [Rule] 60(b)(6) is not a procedural issue 
unique to patent law, and thus we will apply the law of the regional circuit court . . . . 
Moreover, the underlying reasons for Louisville’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion . . . do not uniquely 
implicate patent law.” (citation omitted)), with Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court’s Rule 60(b) ruling turns on 
substantive matters that pertain to patent law, we review the ruling under Federal Circuit law 
because ‘we perceive a clear need for uniformity and certainty in the way the district courts 
treat [the] issue.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v. 
Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). 
 43. See infra notes 58–86 and accompanying text. 
 44. 513 U.S. 18 (1994). 
 45. Id. at 20. 
 46. Id. at 25. 
 47. Id. at 26. 
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circumstances do not include the mere fact that the settlement agreement provides 
for vacatur.”48 
Because Bancorp was decided in the context of vacatur by federal appellate 
courts, which is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2106,49 its holding is not considered 
binding precedent for district courts.50 Indeed, the Court sidestepped the issue of 
vacatur at the district court level by concluding the Bancorp opinion with a 
suggestion to the appellate courts to essentially punt the issue: 
[E]ven in the absence of, or before considering the existence of, 
extraordinary circumstances, a court of appeals presented with a request 
for vacatur of a district-court judgment may remand the case with 
instructions that the district court consider the request, which it may do 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).51 
Nevertheless, because the holding in Bancorp turns on the equitable nature of 
vacatur as a form of extraordinary relief—as opposed to any inherent 
characteristics of the appellate courts52—at least one regional circuit court has 
treated the Bancorp “exceptional circumstances” requirement as being essentially 
coextensive with the showing of “extraordinary circumstances” required for Rule 
60(b)(6),53 which similarly precludes relief if the movant deliberately chose not to 
appeal.54 However, not all circuits share this view, as some have espoused a less 
rigorous standard than “extraordinary circumstances” for settlement-related vacatur 
at the district court level.55 Further complicating the situation is the lack of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Id. at 29.  
 49. The Supreme Court and the courts of appeal derive their power to vacate judgments 
from 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which states: 
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, 
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a 
court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and 
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require 
such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances. 
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006). 
 50. See, e.g., Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(observing that “the holding of Bancorp extends only to appellate court vacatur”); see also 
Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc. 342 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk, J., concurring) 
(“[B]y its terms, Bancorp does not apply to district courts but rather only to the Supreme 
Court and to courts of appeals.” (citing Valero, 211 F.3d at 117–20)). 
 51. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29. 
 52. See Valero, 211 F.3d at 118–19 (“[T]he particular considerations adopted by the 
Court in Bancorp derived exclusively from the extraordinary and equitable nature of the 
relief of vacatur, rather than . . . from any power or ability unique to the appellate courts.”). 
 53. See id. at 121 (“[T]he Bancorp considerations that are relevant to appellate vacatur 
for mootness are also relevant to, and likewise largely determinative of, a district court’s 
vacatur decision for mootness under Rule 60(b)(6) . . . .”); supra note 35. 
 54. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 200 (1950) (holding that petitioner 
was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because of his “voluntary, deliberate, free, 
untrammeled choice . . . not to appeal”). 
 55. See, e.g., Marseilles Hydro Power LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 481 F.3d 
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precedent governing the settlement-related vacatur of interlocutory rulings under 
Rule 54(b),56 even though, as discussed in greater detail in Part IV, a substantial 
proportion of vacatur motions are filed prior to the entry of final judgment.57 
Turning now to the Federal Circuit, no post-Bancorp58 Federal Circuit decision 
has squarely analyzed the merits of a district court’s decision to grant or deny 
vacatur in light of various private, public, and judicial considerations. To the extent 
that post-Bancorp Federal Circuit precedent exists, it either relates to procedural or 
collateral issues without reaching the merits of the district court’s disposition of a 
vacatur motion,59 or focuses on the Federal Circuit’s own ability to vacate the 
judgment of its subordinate tribunals.60 
The lack of instructive Federal Circuit precedent reflects the rarity of appeals 
challenging a district court’s disposition of a settlement-related motion for vacatur. 
In order for such an appeal to exist, a third-party objector who was properly granted 
                                                                                                                 
1002, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The Court in Bancorp said that the court of appeals can remand 
a case even in the absence of [exceptional] circumstances, which would make no sense if the 
district court could not vacate its judgment in that absence.” (internal citation omitted)); Am. 
Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods., Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1998) (“According to the 
post-[Bancorp] Ninth Circuit decisions, the district court below could have vacated its own 
judgment using [an] equitable balancing test even if [the parties] had mooted their case by 
settlement.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Lycos, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. 07-11469-MLW, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 136252, at *7 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010) (“Although the court has the power to 
modify the orders at issue, there is little authority describing when, if ever, the court should 
exercise this power to grant vacatur of a non-final order in connection with settlement.”). 
 57. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
 58. Pre-Bancorp cases are not instructive because in that era, the Federal Circuit had an 
established practice of vacating the judgment under review whenever the parties settled on 
appeal. See, e.g., Laber v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 982 F.2d 519, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“When 
parties settle while a case is on appeal, the proper course is not to dismiss. It is to vacate the 
trial tribunal’s decision and to remand to the trial tribunal with instructions to dismiss.”). 
This practice is disallowed under Bancorp and is no longer in use at the Federal Circuit. 
 59. See, e.g., Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (remanding case for limited purpose of allowing district court to consider parties’ 
settlement-related motion for vacatur); Ericsson, Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns Corp., 418 
F.3d 1217, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have reversed the district court’s decision allowing 
Nokia to intervene to seek reinstatement of the vacated orders. . . . [I]t is not necessary for us 
to address whether the district court’s original vacatur order in light of the settlement was 
proper under [Bancorp].”). 
 60. See, e.g., Tessera, Inc. v. ITC, 646 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that 
expiration of patents during litigation caused mootness by happenstance, and applying 
Bancorp to vacate a portion of the ITC’s final determination relating to expired patents), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2702 (2012); Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(denying vacatur because “the agency [(the losing party)] itself has voluntarily withdrawn 
the regulations and thus set the stage for a declaration of mootness”); Kaw Nation v. Norton, 
405 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (vacating decision of Interior Board of Contract Appeals 
under Bancorp in light of “exceptional circumstances” arising from the potential effect of 
judgment on the party that objected to circumstances that caused mootness, and uncertainty 
regarding the Board’s authority to resolve the dispute); Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM 
Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (denying vacatur where appeal was mooted 
by settlement). 
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intervention61 must appeal from the district court’s decision to grant vacatur. This is 
expected to be rare for two reasons. First, third-party objectors may not become 
aware of the grant of vacatur until it is too late to seek intervention.62 Second, 
motions for intervention are often unsuccessful because preserving the collateral 
estoppel effect of a ruling is not deemed a substantial interest that justifies 
intervention as of right,63 and courts are unlikely to grant permissive intervention64 
in such circumstances, given their preference to have cases settle without 
interference by third parties.65 
In view of the lack of post-Bancorp Federal Circuit precedent addressing the 
merits of settlement-related vacatur at the district court level, perhaps the most 
relevant guidance to date may be found in a few concurring opinions, most notably 
in Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc.66 and Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc.67 
In Dana, the plaintiff sought to invoke offensive collateral estoppel based on a 
non-final ruling in order to prevent the accused infringers from asserting certain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. See, e.g., Ericsson, 418 F.3d at 1224 (“Without intervention, there is no proper party 
with standing to be afforded relief under Rule 60(b). Therefore, it is not necessary for us to 
address whether the district court’s original vacatur order in light of the settlement was 
proper under [Bancorp].”). 
 62. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 621 n.165 (“[I]t is rare that third parties who might 
benefit from the preclusive effect of a judgment will learn of the threat to the judgment in 
time to make their presence known to the court.”). 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). A third party’s interest in preserving the collateral estoppel 
effect of a ruling is not deemed a protectable interest for purposes of intervention as of right. 
See, e.g., Korczak v. Sedeman, 427 F.3d 419, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The opportunity to use a 
judgment in a suit to which one is not a party to gain an advantage in a suit to which one is a 
party is valuable, but the denial of the opportunity is not a sufficient injury to confer 
standing.”); Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[The 
potential intervenor’s] interest in the collateral estoppel effect of the jury’s verdict in this 
case is too collateral, indirect, and insubstantial to support intervention as of right.”). More 
generally, the relationship between intervention and Article III standing remains unsettled. 
See, e.g., Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]t 
some fundamental level the proposed intervenor must have a stake in the litigation. Some 
disagreement remains among the circuits about how Article III standing rules intersect with 
the requirements for Rule 24 intervention. This remains a question that the Supreme Court 
has not resolved.” (citations omitted)); see also 6 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 24.03[2][d] 
(“[T]here is confusion and conflict among the federal courts regarding whether movants to 
intervene [as of right] must independently satisfy standing requirements in addition to the 
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).”). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (“On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to 
intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common 
question of law or fact.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Purcell, 85 F.3d at 1513 (noting that “public policy values . . . are 
furthered by permitting parties to settle a case without the interference of interlopers”); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3) (“In exercising its discretion [to grant permissive intervention], 
the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”). 
 66. 342 F.3d 1320, 1327–29 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 67. 629 F.3d 1374, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring). 
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defenses.68 The Federal Circuit held that the non-final ruling satisfied the legal 
requirements for collateral estoppel, but remanded the case for additional findings 
relating to its offensive (as opposed to defensive) use.69 In concurrence, Federal 
Circuit Judge Timothy Dyk suggested that parties who settle during district court 
litigation might consider moving to vacate non-final rulings so as to prevent them 
from having collateral estoppel effect.70 According to Judge Dyk, Bancorp posed 
no barrier to such an arrangement: “Bancorp did not . . . address the power of the 
district court to vacate non-final orders pursuant to a settlement agreement. Indeed, 
by its terms, Bancorp does not apply to district courts but rather only to the 
Supreme Court and to courts of appeals.”71 Notably, in the dataset compiled for the 
empirical study, Judge Dyk’s concurrence in Dana was cited in the vacatur motions 
filed in at least 16 cases72 (out of 79), targeting non-final rulings as well as final 
judgments, and it was also cited in the orders issued in 2 cases granting vacatur of 
non-final rulings. 
In contrast to Judge Dyk’s concurrence in Dana, Federal Circuit Judge 
Kimberly Moore’s concurrence in Ohio Willow Wood suggests that Bancorp is 
highly relevant at the district court level, taking the view that settlement-related 
vacatur in the absence of “exceptional circumstances” may adversely impact the 
public interest.73 Ohio Willow Wood was a precedential order issued by the Federal 
Circuit in 2011 that formalized its practice of granting “limited remands” to allow 
the parties to jointly move the district court to vacate the appealed judgment in 
connection with a settlement. The “limited remand” practice appears to originate 
from the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Bancorp that an appeals court, when 
presented with a request to vacate a district court judgment, could remand the case 
to allow the district court to consider vacatur.74 Although this practice has been in 
use at the Federal Circuit since the Bancorp decision,75 the “limited remand” orders 
were apparently all nonprecedential before the Ohio Willow Wood order was issued 
in 2011.76 
Notably, the precedential portion of the Ohio Willow Wood order did not contain 
any official pronouncements on whether settlement-related motions for vacatur 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Dana, 342 F.3d at 1320–23. 
 69. Id. at 1325–27. 
 70. Id. at 1328 (Dyk, J., concurring) (noting that preventing non-final decisions from 
having collateral estoppel effect in future litigation “could perhaps be accomplished by 
moving to vacate the district court’s earlier decision as part of the settlement”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Some motions were filed under seal, so 16 is a lower bound. 
 73. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Moore, J., concurring). 
 74. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994). 
 75. Bancorp was decided in November 1994. The earliest post-Bancorp case (for which 
an opinion is electronically available on Lexis), where the Federal Circuit appears to follow 
Bancorp’s suggestion and remands a case to a subordinate tribunal for it to consider a 
vacatur motion, is Dyncorp v. O’Leary, No. 94-1493, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 449 (Fed. Cir. 
Jan. 4, 1995). 
 76. This is based on a Lexis search of Federal Circuit opinions and orders issued 
between the Bancorp ruling and the Ohio Willow Wood order. 
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should be granted by district courts.77 Rather, the panel unanimously decided to 
entrust the disposition of the vacatur motion to the discretion of the district court 
from which the appeal originated.78 However, one of the panel members, Judge 
Moore, cautioned in a concurring opinion that the Federal Circuit’s limited remand 
order should not be “construed as an imprimatur on the joint vacatur motion.”79 
Citing Bancorp and extending its holding to the district court context, Judge Moore 
stressed that “[o]nly in ‘exceptional circumstances’ should a district court grant 
vacatur at the request of the litigants.”80 Emphasizing that “patents are public rather 
than private rights,”81 Judge Moore observed that “[t]he public rights are 
particularly vulnerable when considering vacatur following settlement,” as “[t]here 
will be no opposing voice when the parties move for vacatur because both parties 
benefit.”82 Included among the considerations Judge Moore highlighted as relevant 
to deciding a motion to vacate are the litigiousness of the patentee and the value of 
collateral estoppel in saving the courts and litigants the time and expense of 
relitigating issues in patent cases, which are among the most time-consuming and 
costly types of civil actions.83 
At one level, the apparent inconsistency between Judge Dyk’s concurrence in 
Dana and Judge Moore’s concurrence in Ohio Willow Wood on the relevance of 
Bancorp to settlement-related vacatur at the district court level might be 
attributable to the fact that a non-final order was at issue in Dana, whereas Ohio 
Willow Wood involved a final judgment. However, as explained in greater detail in 
later sections, the data reveal that treating non-final rulings differently from final 
judgments in the context of settlement-related vacatur promote neither judicial 
economy nor the public interest.84 In addition, a further wrinkle in the Federal 
Circuit’s messaging on the issue of settlement-related vacatur is introduced by its 
Appellate Mediation Program:85 to some parties, the Chief Circuit Mediator 
apparently suggests the filing of a motion to vacate certain rulings under review—
including invalidity rulings—in order to facilitate settlement.86 However, as a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See Ohio Willow Wood, 629 F.3d at 1375. 
 78. Id. On remand, the district court in Ohio Willow Wood denied vacatur even though it 
would void the parties’ settlement. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 769 F. 
Supp. 2d 1065, 1070–71 (E.D. Tex. 2011). When the parties resumed their appeal, the 
district court’s judgment was summarily affirmed. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, 
Inc., 440 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 79. Ohio Willow Wood, 629 F.3d at 1376. (Moore, J., concurring). Viewing Judge 
Moore’s concurrence as “placing an appellate thumb on the scale of the remand order before 
it reaches its destination,” another member of the panel, Federal Circuit Judge Pauline 
Newman, wrote separately to stress that Judge Moore’s concurrence was not part of the 
remand order. Id. at 1376 (Newman, J., additional views). 
 80. Id. (Moore, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at n.1. 
 83. See id. at 1376–77. 
 84. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2, V.B. 
 85. For generalized information about the Federal Circuit’s Appellate Mediation 
Program, see Mediation, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT,  http://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/mediation/mediation.html. 
 86. See infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
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matter of official court policy, neither the Federal Circuit nor its Appellate 
Mediation Program takes a position on whether such motions should be granted.87 
Thus, in the absence of any post-Bancorp precedential opinions on the merits of 
settlement-related vacatur by district courts, the Federal Circuit, which currently 
takes no position on whether such motions should be granted, may be, nevertheless, 
sending district courts and litigants mixed messages on the issue through the 
concurrences in Dana and Ohio Willow Wood, as well as the limited remands based 
on the results of its Appellate Mediation Program where motions for settlement-
related vacatur may be proposed by the mediators. 
II. DESIGN OF EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
To critically explore the considerations highlighted in the previous sections, an 
empirical study was devised to investigate the following questions: (1) what is the 
nature of the current practice relating to the filing and disposition of motions for 
settlement-related vacatur? and (2) to what extent should the practice of granting 
settlement-related vacatur be curtailed? 
To this end, various statistics were gathered to discern the relative influence of, 
and the interrelationships among, the three interests implicated by settlement-
related vacatur: (1) the “private” interest of the litigants in resolving their dispute; 
(2) the “public” interest—namely those of the general public as well as potential 
accused infringers—in the finality of judgments and avoiding dubious claims of 
patent infringement; and (3) the “judicial” interest—in particular, the court’s 
interest in efficient case management and judicial economy. The conventional 
wisdom is that the relative weights of these considerations are heavily biased in 
favor of the intersection of the interests of the private parties and the courts, in view 
of the judiciary’s strong preference for settlement.88 However, the mechanism and 
any second-order effects of this imbalance are not well documented, at least for 
district court patent cases. In order to craft a set of workable recommendations to 
correct the imbalance, or even to shift it toward the public interest, familiarity with 
the nature of the motions filed, their manner of disposition, and their impact is 
necessary. Accordingly, descriptive statistics were collected on: 
(a) the types of rulings targeted for vacatur, as characterized by the 
subject matter, form of issuance, finality (final judgments 
versus interlocutory rulings), and age; 
(b) the manner in which the courts rule on the motions for vacatur; 
(c) case duration; 
(d) the extent to which settlements are conditioned on vacatur; 
(e) the characteristics of the patents affected by the rulings for 
which vacatur is sought (in particular, the litigation history, the 
type of patentee, and the technology area); and  
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Appellate Mediation Program Guidelines, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT 
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/mediation/guidelines.html § 8 (“Neither the 
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit nor its Mediation Program takes a position of 
whether the motion for vacatur should be granted.”). 
 88. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
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(f) whether intervention provides interested third parties with an 
adequate means of challenging a motion for settlement-related 
vacatur. 
As described in greater detail in Part IV, courts granted vacatur in a clear 
majority of cases in the dataset (78.5%; 62 out of 79),89 typically without any 
detailed analysis (83.9%; 52 out of 62 granted cases),90 and with a degree of 
alacrity that would make it difficult for third parties to timely object and move to 
intervene—vacatur was granted within 4 days in more than half of the granted 
cases (35 out of 62), and, in 22.6% of the granted cases (14 out of 62), vacatur was 
granted either on the same day or without a publicly-accessible, written motion 
having been filed beforehand.91 Intervention motions were filed in only 4 out of the 
79 cases in the dataset (5.1%), and intervention was granted in only one case.92 
However, the proportion of cases in which vacatur was denied is surprising—
almost a fifth of vacatur motions were denied (19%; 15 out of 79 cases).93 Because 
vacatur is not guaranteed, the filing of settlement-related vacatur motions at the 
district court level currently appears to function primarily as a bargaining chip 
during settlement negotiations, as opposed to being part of a plan by the patentee to 
take a wait-and-see approach to litigation.94 Indeed, the average duration of the 
cases where vacatur was granted (1246 days) is similar to that of the cases where 
vacatur was denied (1304 days) and of comparable cases where vacatur was never 
requested (1218 days).95 
Furthermore, the data reveal that district courts appear to grant vacatur largely 
without regard to the litigation history of the patent,96 the type of patentee,97 
whether the ruling targeted for vacatur is final or interlocutory,98 or the existence of 
concurrent proceedings involving the same patent in other courts.99 
Overall, the results suggest that district courts in patent cases are routinely 
granting vacatur primarily for near-term docket management purposes—even when 
it would undermine judicial economy and the public interest in curtailing the 
anticompetitive effects of dubious infringement claims and weak patents. 
III. COMPILATION OF THE DATASET 
The empirical study reported in this Article is based upon an original “vacatur 
dataset” of U.S. district court patent cases filed on or after January 1, 2000,100 in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. See infra Part IV. 
 90. See infra Part IV.B. 
 91. See infra Part IV.F. 
 92. See infra Part IV.F. 
 93. See infra Part IV. 
 94. See infra Part IV.C. 
 95. See infra Part IV.C.  
 96. See infra Part IV.E.1. 
 97. See infra Part IV.E.2. 
 98. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 99. See infra Part IV.E.1. 
 100. The IPLC database, which was the primary source of cases for this study, contains 
patent cases filed beginning January 1, 2000. Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, supra 
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which a joint or unopposed101 settlement-related102 motion for vacatur was filed and 
decided103 between January 1, 2006, and January 3, 2011, where the motion 
targeted at least one of the following four types of rulings: (1) claim construction, 
(2) noninfringement, (3) invalidity, or (4) unenforceability. A total of 79 cases were 
found.104 
The subject matter of the rulings targeted for vacatur was limited to the four 
listed above because of the public’s interest in removing the burdens on commerce 
and competition imposed by patents that are invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed. While there are other types of rulings for which settlement-related 
vacatur might be requested, such as orders relating to remedies or sanctions, they 
were not included in the dataset because their impact tends to be largely localized 
to the parties and their counsel, rather than affecting the patent itself. 
In other words, the subject-matter restriction for the dataset focuses on whether 
the patentee seeks to vacate a ruling that would somehow impair the extent to 
which a patent may be repeatedly wielded against the public. In addition to 
invalidity and unenforceability rulings, claim construction105 and noninfringement 
rulings were included because they enhance the public notice function of a patent 
by providing notice of which products may fall outside the scope of the claims. 
Claim construction and noninfringement rulings are especially important where the 
potential accused products in a given industry (1) comply with a technical standard 
(e.g., any Wi-Fi-compatible device may infringe a patent covering the Wi-Fi 
standard); (2) possess a material feature that is implemented in a substantially 
similar manner across products made by different manufacturers (e.g., any 
smartphone that unlocks when a user slides a finger across the touchscreen could 
infringe a patent covering that interface feature); or (3) are essentially identical 
(e.g., generic drugs). 
In addition to subject matter constraints, the rulings were further restricted to 
those that could potentially be accorded collateral estoppel effect. To this end, non-
final, interlocutory rulings, such as claim constructions and partial summary 
judgment rulings, were counted in addition to final judgments because non-final 
                                                                                                                 
note 8. 
 101. Settlement-related motions for vacatur that are actually opposed by one of the 
settling parties are extremely rare. Such motions were not counted for this Article, which 
focuses on the more common yet problematic situation where vacatur is requested and there 
is no opposing voice, other than from a third-party objector. 
 102. The dataset excludes cases where the only item targeted is a ruling that warrants 
vacatur on a ground independent from facilitating settlement. For example, if the sole item 
listed in the vacatur motion is a judgment that warrants vacatur under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(5) because the judgment was based on an earlier decision that has since been reversed 
or vacated, then that case was not included in the dataset. 
 103. For completeness, cases in which the motion was subsequently withdrawn were also 
included in the dataset. 
 104. The completeness of the dataset is necessarily limited by the completeness of the 
data sources (IPLC, Westlaw, and Docket Navigator) and the search functions used to 
compile the dataset. 
 105. In coding the dataset, a claim construction ruling that was targeted for vacatur was 
presumed to contain at least one construction that the patentee perceived as unfavorable. 
Further, it was assumed that a patentee would not agree to vacate a claim construction ruling 
that it considered wholly beneficial. 
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rulings have been accorded collateral estoppel effect in some cases.106 Also, the 
rulings of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability that were counted for 
the purposes of the dataset were those “actually decided” on the merits, such as the 
grant of an accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment (as opposed to a 
denial of a motion).107 Claim construction rulings, which are pronouncements by 
the court on the meaning of claim terms,108 were counted without regard to the 
form in which they were delivered by the court (whether in a standalone order or in 
a hearing transcript). Finally, the dataset does not include cases where the only item 
targeted in the vacatur motion is a stipulated judgment entered solely to facilitate 
appeal, because such stipulations are not usually deemed “actually litigated” for the 
purpose of invoking collateral estoppel.109 
With respect to temporal restrictions, the five-year time span of the vacatur 
dataset—January 1, 2006 to January 3, 2011—was chosen to minimize any artifacts 
in the results that might be introduced as a result of the limitations of the data 
sources and changes in the relevant case law. Specifically, January 1, 2006, was 
chosen as the starting date because: (1) the primary source of patent case data for 
this empirical study, the IPLC, starts with cases that were filed in 2000,110 such that 
beginning the dataset in 2006 would minimize any artifacts attributable to the 
absence of any pre-2000 cases;111 (2) the Federal Circuit’s Dana decision with 
Judge Dyk’s concurrence was issued in 2003;112 and (3) the Federal Circuit began 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. See, e.g., TM Patents L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375–79 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (according collateral estoppel effect to claim construction order); see also Dana v. E.S. 
Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Eleventh Circuit law in 
holding that partial summary judgment orders satisfied legal prerequisites for applying 
collateral estoppel). 
 107. See, e.g., Kay-R Elec. Corp. v. Stone & Webster Constr. Co., 23 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“[I]t is clear that for collateral estoppel to bar a party on an issue, the issue in dispute 
must actually have been litigated and actually decided. . . . The denial of a motion for 
summary judgment is not such.”). 
 108. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that 
“the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the 
province of the court”). 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 804 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1986) (“A fact 
established in prior litigation not by judicial resolution but by stipulation has not been 
‘actually litigated’ and thus is the proper subject of proof in subsequent proceedings.” 
(citation omitted)). The Federal Circuit further refined this rule in Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 
869 F.2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1989), holding that, in determining whether issue preclusion 
may arise from a stipulated judgment, “the primary consideration is the intent of the parties.” 
 110. See supra note 100. 
 111. That is, the vacatur dataset would not include any pre-2000 cases that were pending 
on or after January 1, 2006. The number of omitted pre-2000 cases having a settlement-
related motion for vacatur that would satisfy both the subject matter and time period 
restrictions for the vacatur dataset is expected to be negligible because patent cases pending 
longer than six years are outliers. For example, out of the 1756 cases filed in 1997, only 66 
(4%) had a duration of five or more years. Kesan & Ball, supra note 11, at 282, tbl.11. 
Similarly, out of the 2081 cases filed in 2000, only 62 (2.5%) were pending on February 15, 
2006. Id. at 282, tbl.11, n.253. 
 112. Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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its Appellate Mediation Program in late 2005.113 As for the end date of the dataset, 
January 3, 2011, was chosen because the Federal Circuit issued its precedential 
Ohio Willow Wood “limited remand” order on January 4, 2011, such that limiting 
the vacatur dataset to filings and rulings on or before January 3, 2011, would allow 
the data to be analyzed without the need to factor in the influence, if any, of that 
order or Judge Moore’s concurrence.114 
The 79 district court cases115 in the dataset were identified primarily using the 
IPLC, supplemented with searches in Westlaw and Docket Navigator.116 The IPLC 
allows Boolean searching of individual docket entries,117 as well as certain case 
documents—primarily complaints, opinions, orders, and judgments. A 
supplemental search was also performed in Westlaw,118 which has a collection of 
searchable civil trial filings. As a further check, a search was performed on Docket 
Navigator, which contains a substantial collection of searchable district court orders 
in the more recent cases.119 
Sources of underinclusiveness in the dataset include the failure to discover cases 
where the settlement-related vacatur motion was filed under seal with 
uninformative docket text, and the resulting ruling by the court does not reveal the 
nature of the relief requested in the sealed motion (such as where the ruling refers 
to the motion only by the docket number). Similarly, if the motion was presented 
informally or off-the-record at a hearing or at a conference—and the court provided 
only an oral ruling—then such cases would have been missed as well. Where both 
the motion and the court’s ruling are obscured from the public in this manner, it is 
likely that vacatur was denied rather than granted, because the fact that a docket 
item has been vacated would need to be made clear in the public record. As a result, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. Appellate Mediation Program Guidelines, supra note 87 (“The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit established an appellate mediation program pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, which commenced on October 3, 2005.”). 
 114. Because the Ohio Willow Wood order does not address the merits of the vacatur 
motion, see Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), and Judge Moore’s concurrence is not binding precedent, see id. at 1375–76 
(Newman, J., additional views), the practice of settlement-related vacatur in district court 
patent cases is unlikely to dramatically change on or after January 4, 2011, in the absence of 
a precedential Federal Circuit decision evaluating the merits of a district court’s ruling on a 
motion for settlement-related vacatur. Nevertheless, the Ohio Willow Wood case may prompt 
some district courts to analyze settlement-related vacatur motions more closely, and the 
empirical study presented in this Article endeavors to provide information that might be 
helpful in evaluating the appropriateness of granting vacatur in a given case. 
 115. Transferred cases and consolidated cases were counted only once. For consolidated 
cases, a single “representative” case was coded for the group, where the case chosen for 
coding was the oldest case that served as the primary docket (usually the “lead” case) 
involving any of the patents that would benefit from the grant of vacatur. 
 116. Out of the 79 cases in the dataset, 74 were found using the IPLC and 5 were found 
using Westlaw. After the IPLC and Westlaw searches, a further search was also performed 
on Docket Navigator; no additional cases were found on Docket Navigator that were not 
previously discovered. 
 117. Appendix A provides details of the searches performed on the IPLC. 
 118. Appendix B provides details of the searches performed on Westlaw. 
 119. Appendix C provides details of the searches performed on Docket Navigator. 
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the risk of undercounting is greater for the cases in which vacatur was denied than 
in the cases in which it was granted. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
For the 79 cases in the dataset, motions for vacatur were granted in 62 cases 
(78.5%),120 denied in 15 cases (19%), and withdrawn by the parties in 2 cases 
(2.5%).121 
A. Profile of Rulings Targeted for Vacatur 
1. Subject Matter and Form of Issuance 
Table 1 tallies the number of cases in the dataset where the vacatur motion 
targeted at least one of the four types of rulings affecting patent scope, validity, or 
enforceability: 
 
Table 1: Rulings Targeted for Vacatur 
Substance of Ruling Number of Cases 
% of Cases 
(out of 79) 
Claim Construction 40 50.6% 
Noninfringement 32 40.5% 
Invalidity 25 31.6% 
Unenforceability 5 6.3% 
 
In Table 1, the total number of cases (and therefore the percentage) exceeds 79 
(or 100%) because a vacatur motion in a given case may target more than one type 
of ruling. To be clear, the numbers in Table 1 do not list the absolute number of 
rulings targeted; rather, Table 1 lists the number of cases in which the vacatur 
motion targets a specific type of ruling. For example, if the vacatur motion in a 
single case targets three separate rulings of noninfringement for different sets of 
patents, the contribution of that case to Table 1 is to increment the 
“Noninfringement” row by one, not three. By counting the number of cases rather 
than the absolute number of rulings targeted for vacatur, the larger, complex cases 
with multiple rulings are not disproportionally represented in the dataset. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. This includes 2 cases in which the parties and the court attempted to achieve the 
substantive effect of vacatur—namely, the elimination of any potential collateral estoppel 
effect—by having the court issue an order declaring that the ruling was limited to that case. 
For the purpose of reporting data and statistical analysis, these cases were counted as 
instances in which vacatur was granted. 
 121. In the 2 cases where the parties withdrew their motions, the parties subsequently 
settled. 
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That claim construction rulings122 were targeted for vacatur in approximately 
half of the cases in the dataset (50.6%; 40 out of 79 cases) appears to reflect their 
dispositive role in determining patent liability issues.123 Indeed, a claim 
construction ruling was the sole item targeted for vacatur in 31.6% of the cases in 
the dataset (25 out of 79 cases). The targeting of claim construction rulings for 
vacatur is noteworthy because the extent to which they may be accorded collateral 
estoppel effect remains unsettled: the Federal Circuit currently applies regional 
circuit law governing collateral estoppel to evaluate the preclusive effect of claim 
construction rulings,124 and has not yet considered the issue directly on the merits 
as a matter of Federal Circuit law.125 In addition, some district courts have accorded 
collateral estoppel effect to claim construction rulings,126 while others have not.127 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Because claim constructions often underlie, and are incorporated into, rulings on 
patent liability issues (such as noninfringement), claim construction rulings were counted as 
a distinct item for vacatur only if the motion made clear that it was the sole reason a specific 
ruling or docket item was being targeted for vacatur. For example, if a case does not have a 
standalone claim construction order, and the vacatur motion targets a ruling granting 
summary judgment of noninfringement that construes several claim terms as part of its 
analysis, the motion was coded as targeting a noninfringement ruling only. Conversely, if a 
standalone claim construction order contained a ruling that a claim term was indefinite, it 
was coded only as a claim construction ruling and not also as an invalidity ruling. 
 123. See PETER S. MENELL, LYNN H. PASAHOW, JAMES POOLEY & MATTHEW D. POWERS, 
PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 2–6 (2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328659 (“[T]he structure and operation of an 
accused device is often undisputed, so that determination of infringement will collapse into a 
question of claim construction. . . . Claim construction is the foundation for analysis of both 
infringement (has the patentee claimed broadly enough?) and invalidity (has the patentee 
claimed too much?).” (citation omitted)). 
 124. See, e.g., RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (analyzing Eleventh Circuit law and denying application of collateral 
estoppel to claim construction ruling). 
 125. Whether a claim construction ruling may be accorded collateral estoppel effect is an 
issue for which at least two petitions for interlocutory appeal were filed in recent years. In 
2009, the Federal Circuit granted a petition for interlocutory appeal on this issue. See Shire 
LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., 345 F. App’x 535, 535 (Fed. Cir. 2009). However, the parties settled 
shortly thereafter and dismissed the appeal. See Shire LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., 368 F. App’x 116 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). In 2010, another petition for interlocutory review was filed, but the Federal 
Circuit denied that petition. See ICU Med., Inc. v. Rymed Techs., Inc., 364 F. App’x 622, 
623 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 126. See, e.g., TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(“[T]he results of the Markman hearing in the [prior] action were sufficiently ‘final’ to 
permit application of collateral estoppel—even though the matter to which they were 
necessary was never reduced to a final judgment after verdict.”); see also Edberg v. CPI—
The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D. Conn. 2001) (“[A]s the TM 
Patents court noted, the mere fact that plaintiffs settled the prior case does not give this 
Court’s prior [claim construction] rulings any less preclusive effect.”); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, 
L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669–71 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (analyzing requirements for issue 
preclusion and concluding that they were satisfied for purpose of according preclusive effect 
to prior claim construction ruling). 
 127. See, e.g., Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468–70 
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In view of this uncertainty, the data suggest that patentees appear to be taking the 
risk-averse route by seeking vacatur of claim construction rulings. 
Turning to the noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability rulings, Table 2 
provides a matrix of the substance of the ruling and its form of issuance. Each cell 
lists the number of cases and its corresponding percentage of the dataset (out of 79 
cases):128 
 
Table 2: Rulings and Form of Issuance Targeted for Vacatur 
(# of cases; % of dataset (79 cases)) 
Form of Issuance Noninfringement Invalidity Unenforceability 
Grant of Summary 
Judgment 28 (35.4%) 21 (26.6%) 2 (2.5%) 
Bench Trial 1 (1.3%) 0 2 (2.5%) 
Jury Verdict 2 (2.5%) 3 (3.8%) 0 
Grant of JMOL 1 (1.3%) 2 (2.5%) 1 (1.3%) 
 
The column totals in Table 2 may exceed those of the rows in Table 1 because a 
vacatur motion in a single case may target a specific type of ruling across different 
forms of disposition. For example, if a vacatur motion targets a ruling granting 
summary judgment of invalidity as well as a jury verdict containing a finding of 
invalidity, they are counted separately in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, the most 
common type of disposition targeted for vacatur is the grant of summary judgment 
of noninfringement (35.4% of cases), followed by the grant of summary judgment 
of invalidity (26.6% of cases). The frequency of each of the remaining types of 
dispositions, many of which involve trials, is in the low single digits. 
The data from Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the timing of settlements in cases 
where settlement-related vacatur is requested may not be appreciably different from 
that of the general population of patent cases that have progressed to a point where 
the court has issued a substantive ruling regarding the merits of the case: settlement 
discussions generally begin in earnest after the issuance of a claim construction 
order or a ruling on a motion for summary judgment but before trial.129 Indeed, as 
                                                                                                                 
(W.D. Va. 2001) (denying collateral estoppel effect to claim construction order); see also 
Graco Children’s Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int’l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
(“[T]he [Supreme] Court in Markman did not guarantee that collateral estoppel would apply 
in every case, and this Court will not extend the Supreme Court ruling to mean as much, 
especially where, as here, the circumstances of the instant action require that a different 
result be reached.”). 
 128. The entire vacatur dataset contains 79 cases, but Table 2, which specifically focuses 
on the noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability rulings targeted for vacatur, does 
not include the 25 cases in the dataset where the sole item targeted for vacatur was a claim 
construction ruling. 
 129. Cf. MENELL ET AL., supra note 123 at 2-7 (“One argument in favor of early, separate 
claim construction is that it may facilitate settlement. . . . [I]t may be fruitful to schedule a 
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discussed in greater detail in Part IV.C, the average duration of the cases in the 
vacatur dataset is similar to the average duration of the cases in the general 
population where the court has reached the merits of the patent liability issues.130 
2. Final Judgments Versus Interlocutory Orders 
Twice as many motions for vacatur were filed before the entry of final judgment 
than afterwards, as shown in Table 3:131 
 
Table 3: Finality and Disposition of Vacatur Motions 
Disposition 
Motion Filed Before 
Final Judgment 
N=50 (% of 50) 
Motion Filed After 
Final Judgment 
N=25 (% of 25) 
Vacatur Granted 41 (82%) 19 (76%) 
Vacatur Denied 9 (18%) 6 (24%) 
 
Notably, motions to vacate interlocutory orders and final rulings were granted at 
comparable rates (82% versus 76%) in the dataset.132 This result is somewhat 
surprising because vacatur after the entry of final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) 
requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,”133 whereas a district court has 
fewer restrictions in vacating an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b).134 That final 
                                                                                                                 
settlement conference to follow shortly after issuance of a claim construction order.”). 
 130. See infra Part IV.C. 
 131. This Table does not include 4 cases from the dataset: 2 cases where the parties 
withdrew their vacatur motions, and 2 cases where the vacatur motion was filed after the 
case was remanded upon completion of an appeal. 
 132. The difference in the grant rates is not statistically significant: using Fisher’s exact 
test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.553. Fisher’s exact test is useful for significance testing 
where the dataset is relatively small such that the Chi-square test may not return accurate 
results. Rick Routledge, Fisher’s Exact Test, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOSTATISTICS 1961, 
1961–62 (Peter Armitage & Theodore Colton eds., 2d ed. 2005), available at http://online
library.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/0470011815.b2a10020/full. The significance levels used 
throughout this Article are as follows: if the p-value is less than 0.05 (5%), the result is 
deemed statistically significant; if it is less than 0.01 (1%), the result is deemed highly 
statistically significant. DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS 482 
(4th ed. 2007). Two-tailed p-values are reported in this Article because it is more 
conservative (that is, less likely to indicate statistical significance) than a one-tailed result. 
See generally R. MARK SIRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 210–12 (3d ed. 2006). 
 133. See supra notes 35 & 54. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 
U.S. 847, 863–64 (1988) (observing that Rule 60(b)(6) “does not particularize the factors 
that justify relief, but . . . it provides courts with authority ‘adequate to enable them to vacate 
judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice,’ while also cautioning 
that it should only be applied in ‘extraordinary circumstances’” (citations omitted)). 
 134. See, e.g., Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Insured Lloyd’s, 786 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (“Not only is [an interlocutory] order not appealable, but it remains within the 
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judgments are being vacated at a rate close to that of interlocutory orders suggests 
that district courts are disproportionately prioritizing settlements over the public’s 
interest in the finality of judgments and the preclusive value of precedent. 
Moreover, the 82% grant rate of motions targeting interlocutory orders appears to 
be a disproportionally high rate of “revising” a ruling under Rule 54(b): outside of 
the context of settlement-related vacatur, district courts very rarely grant motions 
for reconsideration that seek to amend an interlocutory ruling.135 
In short, the high rate of granting vacatur for both interlocutory and final rulings 
is a likely indication that district courts are elevating near-term docket management 
concerns—which may be readily alleviated by settlement—over long-term judicial 
economy and the public interest (particularly those of non-parties). This is a 
recurring pattern in the data, as illustrated in the rest of Part IV. 
3. Age of Rulings Targeted for Vacatur 
The impact of vacatur on third parties and other proceedings is likely to be 
greater the longer a ruling has remained in force. For example, if a ruling in one 
case is based on according collateral estoppel effect to a prior ruling in a different 
case, then the vacatur of that prior ruling could allow the patentee to seek vacatur of 
the later ruling under Rule 60(b)(5).136 In addition to concurrent litigation, there 
may be ripple effects in various non-judicial contexts, including proceedings at the 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office and arbitration. 
Accordingly, data on the “age”137 of the rulings targeted for vacatur were 
collected, as summarized in the table below: 
                                                                                                                 
plenary power of the district court to revise or set aside in its sound discretion without any 
necessity to meet the requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b).”); see also Persistence Software, 
Inc. v. Object People, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 626, 627 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The standard for 
granting a motion to vacate under Rule 54(b) is less rigid than that under Rule 60(b) 
governing vacation of final judgments.”). But see Siemens Med. Sys., Inc. v. Nuclear 
Cardiology Sys., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1421, 1435 (D. Colo. 1996) (“Although Rule 54(b) 
provides that an order that is not explicitly made final is subject to later revision, it would be 
pedantic to contend that all interlocutory orders are therefore ‘tentative’ in any real sense.”). 
 135. 11 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 56.124[1] (“Motions for reconsideration of 
interlocutory summary judgment rulings are rarely granted . . . .”). 
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) provides: “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a 
party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reason[]: . . . [If] the judgment . . . is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or 
vacated . . . .” (emphasis added). 
 137. The age of the targeted ruling associated with each case was calculated as the 
difference between the date on which the targeted ruling was issued and the date of the 
vacatur motion. If there were multiple rulings targeted for vacatur in a single motion, the 
date of the oldest ruling was used. 
  The date of the vacatur motion was coded as the first date on which the parties 
moved for vacatur. In a few cases, more than one version of the vacatur motion was filed 
because the parties were gauging the district court’s willingness to grant vacatur by initially 
requesting an “indicative ruling” (under FED. R. CIV. P. 62.1) in connection with a potential 
“limited remand” during appeal (under FED. R. APP. P. 12.1), and then filing a “formal” 
vacatur motion on remand. In those cases, the date of the motion for the indicative ruling 
was coded as the date of the vacatur motion because it was the first formal motion in the 
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Table 4: Age of Rulings Targeted in Vacatur Motions (in days) 
 
All Cases 
in Dataset 
N=79 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=62 
Vacatur 
Denied 
N=15 
Motion 
Withdrawn 
N=2 
Range 
(Low/High) 6 / 1219 6 / 1219 16 / 853 648 / 670 
Average 329 339 242 659 
Median 227 240 152 659 
Std. Dev. 287 292 252 15.6 
 
In the dataset, the average age of a ruling that was targeted for vacatur is 329 
days (median: 227 days), which provides a substantial period of time for the ruling 
to be discovered by third parties and cited in other proceedings. Although there 
were too few cases where vacatur was denied (N=15) to allow a comparison of the 
average ages for statistical significance,138 it is notable that the average age of the 
targeted rulings where vacatur was denied (242 days; median: 152 days) is actually 
shorter than the average age where vacatur was granted (339 days; median: 240 
days). One possible explanation for this result is that a court might be disinclined to 
vacate a substantive decision so soon after having invested considerable resources 
in its preparation, whereas after the passage of time, the court may be more 
receptive to granting vacatur as a result of “hedonic adaptation.”139 
However, the longer the delay in vacating a ruling after its issuance, the greater 
the likelihood of potential disruption to other proceedings—especially if the ruling 
has been accorded collateral estoppel effect in another case. Indeed, the fact that 
collateral estoppel was successfully invoked in a parallel proceeding may be one of 
the reasons behind a patentee’s desire to seek vacatur of the prior ruling underlying 
the invocation of collateral estoppel: once the prior ruling is vacated, the patentee 
can then move under Rule 60(b)(5) to secure vacatur of the disposition in the 
                                                                                                                 
public record that put the court and any interested third parties on notice of the parties’ desire 
for vacatur. In one case where the patentee filed two vacatur motions in close succession in 
the course of settling with different defendants in a multi-defendant suit, only the first 
vacatur motion was counted and coded because both vacatur motions targeted the same set 
of substantive rulings. 
 138. A two-sample t-test is commonly used to compare the averages of two sets of data 
for statistical significance. See generally SIRKIN, supra note 132, at 271–74. In order for the 
t-test to produce reliable results, each constituent set should contain at least thirty 
observations. Carmen R. Wilson VanVoorhis & Betsy L. Morgan, Understanding Power 
and Rules of Thumb for Determining Sample Sizes, 3 TUTORIALS QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
FOR PSYCHOL. 43, 48 tbl.3 (2007), available at http://www.tqmp.org/Content/vol03-
2/p043/p043.pdf. 
 139. “Hedonic adaptation” refers to the tendency to return to a baseline emotional state 
after a positive or a negative experience. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic 
Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302, 302 (Daniel 
Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999) (“Hedonic adaptation refers to a 
reduction in the affective intensity of favorable and unfavorable circumstances.”). 
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parallel proceeding that resulted from the application of collateral estoppel.140 In 
this manner, the patentee can strip from a court in a concurrent case the efficiency 
gains from having applied collateral estoppel, so as to place that court in a position 
where it may need to readjudicate the same issues. Accordingly, a court can 
minimize the prejudice to third parties and other courts by denying vacatur based 
on the “age” of the ruling targeted for vacatur, or if there is a concurrent proceeding 
involving the same patent. 
B. Manner of Disposition of Vacatur Motion 
When ruling on vacatur motions, courts generally granted or denied the motion 
as a whole, even though the nature and scope of the relief sought in the 79 vacatur 
motions varied in type and number. The number of docket items targeted for 
vacatur in a given motion ranged from 1 to 20, with an average of 2 docket items 
targeted per motion. A vacatur motion will often target multiple items on the 
docket because the patentee will seek to vacate not only a specific ruling, but also 
any related items. For example, if a patentee desires to eliminate any preclusive 
effect associated with a noninfringement ruling, the motion might list not only the 
associated memorandum opinion granting summary judgment of noninfringement, 
but also the minute order of the hearing during which the court provided a tentative 
ruling, the opinion denying the patentee’s motion for reconsideration, and the entry 
of judgment in favor of the accused infringer based on the noninfringement ruling. 
Furthermore, in 11 out of 79 cases (13.9%), the vacatur motions also targeted 
affirmative rulings141 that were adverse to the accused infringer on an issue of 
patent liability, in addition to the items that the patentee targeted. 
A comparison between the relief requested in the motion for vacatur and the 
court’s ruling on the motion was possible in 73 out of the 79 cases in the dataset:142 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. For example, in CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or.), 
the patentee, CollegeNET, moved for settlement-related vacatur of an invalidity judgment 
that had been accorded collateral estoppel effect in a concurrent case, CollegeNET, Inc. v. 
ApplyYourself, Inc., No. 3:02-cv-00484-HU (D. Or.). Opinion and Order at 2–6, 
CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. June 8, 2009), ECF No. 
927. After the XAP court granted vacatur, id. at 2, the patentee filed a Rule 60(b)(5) motion 
in the ApplyYourself case to vacate an order granting summary judgment of invalidity on the 
ground that it relied on the now-vacated XAP judgment. Memorandum in Support of 
Unopposed Renewed Motion to Vacate Interlocutory Order Granting Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Invalidity Based on Collateral Estoppel and to Enter Agreed 
Consent Judgment at 2, CollegeNET, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., No. 3:02-cv-00484-HU 
(D. Or. June 10, 2009), ECF No. 741. The ApplyYourself court granted the Rule 60(b)(5) 
motion. Order at 2-3, CollegeNET, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., No. 3:02-cv-00484-HU 
(D. Or. June 12, 2009), ECF No. 743. 
 141. By “affirmative ruling,” the author refers to a disposition granting (rather than 
denying) a motion, a jury verdict, or the entry of judgment. 
 142. In 6 cases, a comparison could not be made: in 2 cases, the parties withdrew their 
vacatur motion; and in 4 cases, a written motion was not filed prior to the court’s ruling, 
such that it could not be determined whether the court modified the relief sought. (There 
were a total of 6 cases in which a written motion was not formally filed, but in 2 of those 
cases, it was possible to ascertain that the court did not modify the relief sought because the 
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the court denied the motion as a whole in 15 cases, granted the motion in full 
without modification in 55 cases, and granted the motion with modifications in 3 
cases. In 2 of the 3 cases where the relief requested was modified, the court’s ruling 
actually increased the number of items vacated,143 and in the remaining case, the 
court provided a substitute form of relief by limiting the effect of the targeted 
ruling to the case so as to achieve the effect of vacatur in extinguishing any 
preclusive effect of the targeted ruling beyond the case.144 In short, of the 58 cases 
where the ruling granting vacatur (or its equivalent) could be compared with the 
original relief sought in the motion, the court granted less than the original relief 
requested, albeit slightly, in only a single case. 
Furthermore, when courts decided vacatur motions, they often did so without 
issuing a fully reasoned opinion explaining the decision to grant or deny vacatur, as 
shown in Table 5 below: 
Table 5: Manner of Disposition of Vacatur Motions145 
Manner of Disposition 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=62 
Vacatur 
Denied 
N=15 
Proposed order adopted without material changes 34 0 
Proposed order modified 1146 3147 
[Proposed order not used] Ruling did not contain 
substantive explanation or analysis 17 5 
[Proposed order not used] Ruling contained 
substantive explanation or analysis 10 7 
 
When granting vacatur, district courts provided a substantive,148 reasoned 
opinion in only 16.1% of cases (10 out of 62 grants). Even where the settlement-
related vacatur motion was filed after the entry of final judgment—which requires a 
showing of “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6)149—courts provided 
substantive explanations in only 4 out of 19 cases (21.1%) where vacatur was 
                                                                                                                 
court’s order was the parties’ proposed order, signed without substantive modification.) 
 143. In these cases, the court’s ruling included additional related docket items for 
vacatur, such as a prior version of the targeted ruling, a related minute order, and an order 
entering judgment that was based on the targeted ruling. The supplementation appears to 
have been made in furtherance of the relief requested by vacating all vestiges of the targeted 
ruling and its effects. It is unknown whether the court added the related items sua sponte or 
had been informally asked to do so by the parties after the motion was filed. 
 144. In coding the dataset, this was counted as a grant of vacatur. 
 145. This table does not include the 2 cases where the vacatur motion was withdrawn. 
 146. The court changed the request for vacatur to a request to limit the ruling to the case, 
which has the substantive effect of vacatur. 
 147. In these cases, the court converted the proposed order to one that denied vacatur, 
such as by replacing the word “grant” with “deny” or striking relevant parts. 
 148. In coding the dataset, a ruling contained “substantive” analysis if it went beyond a 
conclusory statement on the appropriateness of the ruling. 
 149. See supra notes 35 & 54. 
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granted after final judgment. By contrast, when vacatur was denied, the court 
issued a substantive ruling 46.7% of the time (7 out of 15 denials). This disparity in 
the rate of courts providing substantive explanations when granting versus denying 
vacatur (16.1% versus 46.7%) is statistically significant.150 
This is basically the inverse of the scenario contemplated by Bancorp, which 
provides that the grant of vacatur based on settlement is deemed an “extraordinary 
remedy” that is justified only under “exceptional circumstances.”151 Indeed, the 
data suggest that district courts are effectively treating the denial of vacatur as the 
exceptional case that warrants reasoned justification. One possible explanation for 
this result may be that the primary audience for a substantive opinion setting forth 
the bases for denying vacatur may be the appellate court in the event the parties 
appeal (or resume their appeal after a “limited remand”), so as to provide additional 
context of the circumstances under which the parties are seeking appellate 
review.152 
Unfortunately, there are too few cases in the dataset from which to draw any 
firm conclusions as to whether the Federal Circuit might accord greater deference 
to the district court’s judgment when an appeal is prompted by the district court’s 
reasoned refusal to vacate. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that only 2 cases in the 
dataset were appealed after vacatur was denied, and both of those denials were 
delivered through substantive opinions; on appeal, neither case resulted in a 
reversal or a remand.153 In addition, when the district court in Ohio Willow Wood 
denied vacatur during the limited remand, it explained its denial in a thoroughly-
reasoned opinion; when the appeal resumed, the Federal Circuit summarily 
affirmed the judgment.154 Although these three cases may not necessarily denote a 
trend, they do provide a starting point for future research. 
C. Vacatur and Case Duration 
In Bancorp, the Supreme Court observed that settlement-related vacatur “may 
deter settlement at an earlier stage” whereby “[s]ome litigants, at least, may think it 
worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle . . . if, but only if, an unfavorable 
outcome can be washed away by a settlement-related vacatur.”155 However, at the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 150. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.017. 
 151. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Hoffman et al., supra note 18, at 703–04 (“When reversing trial court work, 
appellate judges often comment on the lack of a written opinion. . . . Although empirical 
evidence on whether opinions reduce reversal rates is at best ambiguous, it is possible that 
trial judges believe that writing can protect them from shame.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 153. In one case, the parties eventually dismissed the appeal. Order at 1, Allan Block 
Corp. v. Cnty. Materials Corp., No. 0:05-cv-02879-JNE-JJG (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2010), ECF 
No. 462. In the other case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment. Judgment at 1, Avid 
Identification Sys., Inc. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:04-cv-00183-TJW (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 2, 2010), ECF No. 483 (on appeal, the case was docketed as Avid Identification Sys., 
Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp.). 
 154. See supra note 78. See Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 
1065, 1066–71 (E.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 440 F. App’x 926, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 155. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994) (emphasis 
2013] AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 947 
 
district court level, the data suggest that settlement-related vacatur does not appear 
to substantially affect the timing of settlements156 or case duration;157 rather, it 
appears to function primarily as a bargaining chip during settlement negotiations.158 
Indeed, the average case duration in the vacatur dataset is comparable to the 
average duration in the general population of patent cases where the court had 
reached the merits of the patent liability issues.159 Furthermore, the average 
duration of the cases in the dataset where vacatur was granted is similar to that of 
the cases where vacatur was denied.160 
In compiling the statistics for case duration, the time to termination was coded 
so that it reflected the actual duration of litigation between the parties—from the 
filing of the complaint to the termination of litigation in the district court through 
appeal, if any. As a result, the litigation termination date used to calculate the 
lawsuit duration for this empirical study may be different from the “termination 
date” listed in PACER, which may not always account for the time spent on post-
judgment litigation or appeals.161 In coding the dataset, the date of litigation 
termination used in calculating the case duration was the date on which litigation 
ceased at both the trial and appellate levels between the parties that moved for 
vacatur, as determined as follows: 
(1) The termination date is the date of the following items, whichever 
is later: (i) final district court order disposing of the merits and 
any collateral issues (such as fees and costs), (ii) consent 
judgment, (iii) stipulated dismissal (filed in district court), (iv) 
notice of satisfaction of judgment, or (v) Federal Circuit mandate. 
(2) If there are multiple parties and the vacatur motion is brought in 
connection with a settlement between the patentee and a subset of 
the accused infringers, the termination date is the date on which 
litigation terminates between the settling parties and is 
determined using the criteria set forth in paragraph (1).162 
(3) The time to termination does not include the litigation between 
the patentee and any third-party objector to the vacatur motion 
(such as an intervenor) that continues after the termination of 
litigation between the parties that moved for vacatur. 
The table below summarizes the time to termination for the cases in the dataset: 
 
                                                                                                                 
in original). 
 156. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 157. See infra Table 7. 
 158. See infra Table 7 and note 173. 
 159. See infra Table 7. 
 160. See infra Table 7. 
 161. If the PACER termination date is used, the average case duration for the dataset 
decreases by 96 days. See infra note 163. 
 162. This occurred in 3 out of 79 cases, where the patentee moved to vacate certain 
rulings associated with a specific party with whom the patentee planned to settle, while still 
actively litigating against the non-settling parties. The court granted vacatur in those 3 cases. 
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Table 6: Time Between Filing of Complaint to 
Termination of Litigation in Dataset (in days) 
 
All Cases 
in Dataset 
N=79 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=62 
Vacatur  
Denied 
N=15 
Motion 
Withdrawn 
N=2 
Range 
(Low/High) 225 / 3737 225 / 3737 322 / 2275 1399 / 2277 
Average   1272 1246 1304 1838 
Median 1145 1136 1084 1838 
Std. Dev. 661 687 547 621 
 
The time to termination of the 79 cases in the vacatur dataset ranged from 225 
days to 3737 days, with an average of 1272 days (median: 1145 days).163 Although 
there were too few cases where vacatur was denied (N=15) to allow a comparison 
of the average durations for statistical significance,164 it is nevertheless notable that 
there is hardly any difference in the average (and median) termination times as a 
function of disposition: the granted cases have a slightly shorter average duration 
by 58 days (1246 days versus 1304 days), while their median duration is slightly 
longer than that of the denied cases by 52 days (1136 days versus 1084 days). The 
similarity in the average durations raised another question for investigation: if the 
average duration is not affected by the disposition of the vacatur motion, could it, 
instead, be affected by the fact that vacatur was requested? In other words, if the 
patentee filed a vacatur motion, would it mean that the patentee had taken a wait-
and-see approach that unduly prolonged litigation? As discussed below, the answer 
appears to be “no.”165 
By way of comparison, the average duration of a patent case in the general 
population is approximately 15 months, or 450 days,166 which is a fraction of the 
average duration for the vacatur dataset (1272 days). However, this disparity 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. By way of comparison, if the PACER termination date is used, the average case 
duration is 1176 days, which is 96 days less than the average case duration (1272 days) 
calculated using the specific criteria formulated for the empirical study to account for 
appeals and post-judgment litigation. In calculating the PACER average, 3 cases were 
excluded because the grant of vacatur resulted in the termination of the litigation only as to a 
subset of the settling parties, such that the PACER termination date would not reflect the 
termination of the litigation specifically as to the settling parties. 
 164. See supra note 138. 
 165. See infra notes 169–176 and accompanying text. 
 166. In a study of patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000, the average number of days 
to termination was 418 days, 466 days, and 443 days, respectively. Kesan & Ball, supra note 
11, at 281–82. In a study of 2300 cases filed between January 2000 and March 2008 
involving high-tech patents (that is, those covering hardware, software, and financial 
inventions), the average suit duration was less than 15 months. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, 
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech 
Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1593, 1595, 1605 tbl.6 (2009). 
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reflects the substantial proportion of patent cases in the general population that are 
terminated shortly after filing or on procedural grounds without reaching the 
merits.167 
Accordingly, for a more meaningful comparison of case-duration times, a 
“control” sample was compiled of 100 district court patent cases selected at random 
from a subset of the general population168 where the court reached the merits of the 
patent liability issues, as indicated by the issuance of, at a minimum, (i) a claim 
construction ruling, or (ii) a ruling (this includes minute orders and rulings denying 
summary judgment) addressing the merits of the parties’ theories relating to 
infringement, validity, or enforceability. To minimize potential temporal bias, the 
control cases, like the vacatur dataset, were selected from the IPLC, and the 
termination dates of the control cases were restricted to the same time frame in 
which the vacatur motions were filed and decided (that is, January 1, 2006 to 
January 3, 2011), with the termination dates determined using the same criteria 
described earlier in this section for the vacatur dataset. However, the control sample 
was designed to differ from the dataset in one key aspect: a settlement-related 
motion for vacatur (of any type of ruling) was not filed in any of the 100 control 
cases. 
The table below compares the case duration of the control sample with the 
vacatur dataset. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. Indeed, a substantial percentage of patent cases terminate with hardly any docket 
activity. See, e.g., Kesan & Ball, supra note 11, at 285 tbl.12 (reporting that 43% of patent 
cases filed in 1995, 46% in 1997, and 43% in 2000 terminated with less than 20 documents 
filed). The first twenty documents in a patent case docket are typically the complaint, the 
answer, motions for extensions of time to file responsive pleadings, the summons, various 
administrative orders, corporate disclosure statements, notices of attorney appearance, pro 
hac vice motions, the scheduling order, and other prefatory filings. Only a minority of cases 
reach the summary judgment briefing stage. Id. at 287 (observing that motions for summary 
judgment were filed in 27% of patent cases filed in 1997 and in 24% of cases filed in 2000). 
 168. Cases were randomly selected using the IPLC until 100 cases were collected that fit 
the substance and timing criteria for the “control” sample. The following types of cases were 
excluded: (i) cases terminated based on default judgments or for want of prosecution, (ii) 
cases indefinitely stayed because of reexamination or bankruptcy, (iii) cases dismissed on 
procedural grounds (such as standing, jurisdiction, sufficiency of pleading), and (iv) cases 
where a settlement-related motion for vacatur (of any kind) was filed. To prevent double-
counting, transferred cases were counted only when the case associated with the transferee 
court was selected randomly, and consolidated cases were counted only if the lead case was 
selected randomly. Some consolidated cases (which include multi-jurisdictional litigation) 
can have numerous member cases, such that a single termination date for analytical purposes 
often cannot be suitably chosen; accordingly, consolidated cases involving more than five 
total member cases were excluded. Five was chosen as the limit for the size of the 
consolidated cases in the control sample because it corresponds to the size of the largest 
consolidated case in the vacatur dataset. 
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Table 7: Case Duration: Control Sample and Vacatur Dataset (in days) 
 
Control 
Sample 
N=100 
All Cases 
in Dataset 
N=79 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=62 
Vacatur  
Denied 
N=15 
Motion 
Withdrawn 
N=2 
Range 
(Low/High)  
132 / 3389 225 / 3737 225 / 3737 322 / 2275 1399 / 2277 
Average   1218 1272 1246 1304 1838 
Median 980 1145 1136 1084 1838 
Std. Dev. 692 661 687 547 621 
 
The respective average durations of the control sample (1218 days)169 and that 
of the vacatur dataset (1272 days) differ by only 54 days; this difference is not 
statistically significant.170 Notably, the percentage of cases in the control sample 
that involved an appeal171 (45%; 45 out of 100 cases) was higher than that of the 
vacatur dataset (34.2%; 27 out of 79 cases).172 This result was expected because the 
parties are essentially treating vacatur as an alternative to appeal. 
The similarity in the average case duration between the control sample and the 
vacatur dataset suggests that at least at the district court level, the patentee’s desire 
for settlement-related vacatur does not appear to be the primary motivating force 
behind when the parties begin settlement discussions. Instead, it is more likely that 
vacatur motions are filed as a result of their use as bargaining chips173 during 
settlement negotiations. That is, for the cases in the dataset, settlement-related 
vacatur appears to influence the price of settlements more than their timing. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. For this sample of 100 control cases, the 95% confidence interval for the average 
duration is 1081 to 1355 days, and the margin of error, which is one-half of the confidence 
interval, is +137 days. If the PACER termination date is used, the average case duration for 
the control cases would be 1055 days, which is 163 days less than the average case duration 
(1218 days) calculated using the specific criteria formulated for the empirical study to 
account for appeals and post-judgment litigation. 
 170. Using a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances and unpaired values, the two-
tailed p-value is 0.5929. 
 171. A case was coded as “appealed” if the parties filed a notice of appeal at any point in 
the litigation. Writs of mandamus and notices of appeal filed by non-parties (such as 
potential intervenors) were not counted. 
 172. This difference is not statistically significant. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-
tailed p-value is 0.168. See supra note 132. 
 173. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for 
Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1471, 1491 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose Judgment?] (“When the judicial opinion 
becomes available as a ‘bargaining chip,’ the purchasing power of litigants grows.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Fisch, supra note 2, at 641 (“[A] prevailing litigant may be the 
beneficiary of the bargaining advantage afforded . . . by the additional costs the judgment 
imposes on the other side. A well-informed litigant should be able to negotiate a higher 
postjudgment settlement if he agrees to vacatur as a condition of settlement.”). 
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More generally, the type of “roll the dice” litigation strategy criticized in 
Bancorp174 cannot be successfully executed unless the patentee can be certain—
prior to the issuance of a potentially adverse decision—that the court will actually 
grant vacatur upon request.175 Accordingly, in view of the denial rate of 19% (15 
out of 79 cases) in the dataset, it is unlikely that patentees can confidently engage 
in a “roll the dice” litigation strategy based on the prospect of having the court 
vacate any inconvenient rulings. Furthermore, because a critical trait of a successful 
motion for vacatur at the district court level is the absence of opposition, a patentee 
may not know whether moving for vacatur is a feasible option until the case is at 
the settlement stage, where it may be suggested for the first time by a mediator176 
and the opposing party does not object. 
However, with the increasing sophistication of legal informatics and granular 
docket information available to litigants (such as the IPLC and Docket 
Navigator),177 it may be possible in the near future for patentees to systematically 
analyze and accurately discern the case conditions (such as court/judge, accused 
infringer, opposing counsel) under which motions for settlement-related vacatur 
have a high likelihood of being granted. Repeat litigants could use such information 
to steer cases to certain courts or judges who are known to reliably grant vacatur, 
which could render “rolling the dice” a viable litigation strategy in some cases. 
Accordingly, from the standpoint of judicial economy, it may be beneficial for 
judges to deny settlement-related vacatur so as to avoid developing a reputation for 
granting them. 
D. Vacatur as a Condition of Settlement 
One of the concerns a court may have with a motion for vacatur is whether 
settlement may not occur, or whether a recent settlement may break down (prior to 
the deadline for reopening a terminated case)178 if vacatur were denied. In a 
majority of cases (67.1%; 53 out of 79), the motions did not expressly state that 
settlement was contingent on the grant of vacatur. However, in a sizeable minority 
of cases (22.8%; 18 out of 79) the motions did include an express representation of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Fisch, supra note 2, at 596 
(“[I]f a litigant is certain that the court will subsequently vacate an adverse judgment, the 
availability of vacatur makes going to trial cost-free, apart from litigation costs.” (footnotes 
omitted)). Thus, it is only under a regime that grants settlement-related vacatur motions 
nearly automatically that a party’s desire to “roll the dice” may be the primary influence on 
case duration. 
 176. See, e.g., Mark D. DeBofsky, Mediating in the Appellate Court, 34 LITIG. 47, 51 
(2008) (“[A]s long as the lower court is willing to go along, many mediators use the 
possibility of vacatur as a settlement tool.” (emphasis in original)). 
 177. See supra notes 8–9. 
 178. In some cases, a district court will provide a window during which settling parties 
may reopen a case after termination in the event the settlement fails. See, e.g., Cupid 
Founds., Inc. v. Jupi Corp., No. 2:07-cv-05506-JLL-CCC (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2010), ECF No. 83 
(providing sixty-day window). In 6.3% of the cases in the dataset (5 out of 79), the vacatur 
motion was filed after the date on which litigation terminated. 
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conditionality. The 67.1% and 22.8% figures are lower bounds because the motions 
in the remaining 10.1% of the cases (8 out of 79) were not accessible because they 
were filed under seal or no formal motion was filed. Table 8 tallies the disposition 
of the vacatur motions as a function of any statements of conditionality.179 
 
Table 8: Conditionality Statements and Disposition of  
Vacatur Motions (# of cases) 
Disposition 
No statement in 
Motion conditioning 
settlement on grant 
N=53 (% of 53) 
Motion stated that 
settlement was 
conditioned on grant 
N=18 (% of 18) 
Motion Inaccessible 
(sealed or not filed) 
N=8 (% of 8) 
Granted 37 (69.8%) 18 (100%) 7 (87.5%) 
Denied 15 (28.3%) 0 0 
Motion 
Withdrawn 
1 (1.9%) 0 1 (12.5%) 
 
In the dataset, courts denied vacatur only when the motion did not contain a 
statement that the settlement was conditioned on its grant. In contrast, when the 
motion contained a statement of conditionality, it was granted in every case. The 
difference in the grant rate as a function of whether the vacatur motion contained an 
express statement of conditionality (69.8%, not conditioned, versus 100%, 
conditioned) is highly statistically significant.180 
Based on these results, it may be possible for a patentee to effectively guarantee 
vacatur by representing to the court that the settlement is conditioned on its grant. 
That such contingencies are not more common, as illustrated by the majority of the 
cases in the dataset (67.1%; 53 out of 79) having motions that do not contain a 
statement of conditionality, suggests that accused infringers are often unwilling to 
condition settlement on vacatur, and instead prefer to limit their support of any 
vacatur motion to non-opposition. From the standpoint of judicial economy, 
however, if district courts were to automatically grant vacatur so long as it was an 
express condition of settlement, it may have the perverse effect of rewarding 
patentees who delay settlement until the litigation progresses to a point where the 
patentee has essentially worn down the accused infringer, who might then agree to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. The conditionality variable was coded “yes” only if the motion expressly stated that 
the grant of vacatur was a condition of settlement. The coding was based on the contents of 
the motion, and any briefs or memoranda filed in support, but not any attached exhibits, such 
as settlement agreements, which were usually filed under seal. It was assumed that if the 
parties did intend for the settlement to be contingent on the grant of vacatur, it would be a 
material fact that would have been highlighted in the motion itself. 
 180. Counting only the 71 “accessible” motions, the two-tailed p-value using Fisher’s 
exact test is 0.007. If all 8 “inaccessible” motions contained statements of conditionality, 
then Fisher’s exact test would return a two-tailed p-value of 0.008. Conversely, if all 8 
“inaccessible” motions did not contain any statements of conditionality, then Fisher’s exact 
test would return a two-tailed p-value of 0.009. 
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the patentee’s demand to condition the settlement on the grant of vacatur. As 
discussed in the previous section, a “roll the dice” litigation strategy that delays 
settlement could result if there is a condition under which vacatur is effectively 
guaranteed.181 By denying vacatur even when the settlement agreement is 
contingent on it, district courts may guard themselves against such tactics. 
Furthermore, if the denial of vacatur prompts the parties to actively litigate through 
appeal, allowing the litigation to run its course may ultimately provide greater 
benefits for judicial economy and the public interest because it will lead to a final 
disposition that will lend a degree of certainty on issues affecting patent scope, 
validity, or enforceability. Greater certainty on patent liability issues may result in a 
net decrease in litigation, whereas continued uncertainty may have the opposite 
effect.182 
If the vacatur motion does not contain an express representation that the 
settlement is conditioned on vacatur, the data suggest that its denial is unlikely to 
jeopardize settlement: in each of the 15 cases where the court denied vacatur, the 
settlement remained intact. However, the existence of a settlement may not always 
end litigation. Although the settlement itself may not be contingent on vacatur, 
denial may nevertheless result in continued litigation by the patentee—unopposed. 
This happened in 2 out of the 15 cases where vacatur was denied: litigation 
continued whereby the patentee filed an unopposed appeal from the judgment (and 
the subsidiary rulings) that it had unsuccessfully targeted for vacatur. Notably, 
neither of these appeals resulted in a reversal or a remand: in one of the cases, the 
parties eventually dismissed the appeal,183 and in the other case, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the judgment.184 Such unopposed appeals following the denial of vacatur, 
are, in effect, an attempt by the patentee to have it both ways—a settlement as well 
as an uncontested appeal. This practice could be readily curtailed by the Federal 
Circuit through the rigorous application of the mootness doctrine to appeals 
resulting from the denial of settlement-related vacatur by dismissing the appeal if 
the accused infringer had settled with the patentee and chosen not to oppose the 
appeal on the merits.185 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. See supra Part IV.C. 
 182. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (“In litigation, as in gambling, agreement over the 
outcome leads parties to drop out. . . . Where either the plaintiff or defendant has a 
‘powerful’ case, settlement is more likely because the parties are less likely to disagree about 
the outcome.”). 
 183. Order at 1, Allan Block Corp. v. Cnty. Materials Corp., No. 0:05-cv-02879-JNE-JJG 
(D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2010), ECF No. 462. 
 184. Judgment at 1, Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 
2:04-cv-00183-TJW (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010), ECF No. 483 (on appeal, the case was 
docketed as “Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (“While in some circumstances the opposing party’s lack of interest will not bar 
adjudication on the merits, the outcome is different when the appellant is responsible for the 
opposing party’s lack of continued interest, for example, as here by a settlement.” (internal 
citation omitted)). But see Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 
971–72 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A live controversy still exists because [the accused infringer] 
remained free under the settlement agreement to oppose this appeal on the merits. That it 
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E. Patent Characteristics, Vacatur, and Relitigation 
1. Litigation History 
If a patent186 has a history of being litigated, would a district court be more or 
less likely to grant vacatur of an adverse ruling affecting that patent? Surprisingly, 
the vacatur grant rate in cases involving a patent with a history of litigation is 
similar to those cases where the patent has no such history,187 even though the 
former have a much higher likelihood of being involved in future litigation.188 
To analyze settlement-related vacatur in the context of a patent’s litigation 
history, the author gathered the relevant data as follows: for each case in the 
dataset, each docket item targeted in the vacatur motion was reviewed to determine 
which patents would be affected by (that is, benefit from) the grant of vacatur, and 
those patent numbers were entered into the IPLC search field to determine whether 
those patents were asserted in other cases. In tallying the number of suits associated 
with the patents189 for a given case in the dataset,190 transferred cases were counted 
once. If the same patent was asserted in multiple cases that were later consolidated, 
the individual member cases were counted separately. False marking cases were not 
counted. 
In over half of the cases in the dataset (54.4%; 43 out of 79 cases), the patentee 
sought vacatur of rulings affecting patents with a history of litigation at the time the 
vacatur motion was filed, which confirms the analysis in the academic literature 
that repeat litigants are more likely to seek vacatur.191 The 43 cases (out of 79) in 
                                                                                                                 
chose not to submit a brief does not deprive this court of jurisdiction over the issues on 
appeal.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 186. Throughout this Article, all references to “patents” associated with a case in the 
dataset will refer to those patents that would be affected by (that is, benefit from) the grant of 
vacatur, which may be a subset of the patents in a given case. 
 187. See infra Table 9. 
 188. See infra Tables 11a & 11b. 
 189. While it would have been ideal to compile the litigation history on a claim-by-claim 
basis rather than on the patent as a whole, finding reliable claim information is difficult 
because the identity of the asserted claims is usually not available in a public filing until the 
parties prepare substantive briefs for claim construction or summary judgment, which will 
not exist for cases that were filed recently or that terminated prior to the claim construction 
briefing stage. In contrast, compiling the litigation history at the patent level can be 
performed more reliably because the asserted patents are listed in the complaint or in the 
answer (as counterclaims). Also, any lack of precision that may result from focusing on the 
patent, as opposed to each individual claim, is mitigated by the fact that the rulings of 
interest that are targeted for vacatur are generally those that may have collateral estoppel 
effect, which may apply to unadjudicated claims so long as those claims present issues 
identical to the ones that were adjudicated. See Bourns, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 486 
(Ct. Cl. 1976). Bourns, as a decision issued by the Court of Claims, a predecessor court of 
the Federal Circuit, is treated as Federal Circuit precedent. See South Corp. v. United States, 
690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 190. If a case in the dataset has multiple patents that would benefit from the grant of 
vacatur, the litigation histories of those patents were aggregated into a single set of statistics 
associated with that specific case. 
 191. See, e.g., Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 173, at 1488 (“The very existence 
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the dataset that involve patents with a history of litigation may be classified into 
three subtypes: (1) cases having patents that were involved in prior litigation,192 (2) 
cases having patents that are being asserted in concurrent litigation,193 and (3) cases 
having patents that were involved in prior litigation and are also being asserted in 
concurrent litigation. The distribution of cases having patents falling under one of 
these three subtypes is shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1:  Distribution of Cases in Dataset Involving Patents 
Having One of Three Possible Types of Litigation History 
(# of Cases and % of Dataset (out of 79 cases)) 
 
 
    No Litigation  
    History: 36 (45.6%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to eliminating any potential collateral estoppel effect of an adverse 
ruling, a patentee may seek vacatur for a variety of reasons unrelated to litigation, 
including, (i) protecting its position in extrajudicial proceedings (for example, 
arbitration or proceedings in the Patent Office), (ii) initiating a licensing campaign 
or maintaining the flow of payments from existing licensees,194 and (iii) using the 
                                                                                                                 
of a reported opinion might also be seen as an encumbrance, influencing behavior. One can 
therefore assume that not all litigants care equally about the existence of recorded judicial 
opinions and that repeat players are more likely than one-shotters to be proponents of 
vacatur.”). 
 192. In coding the dataset, “prior” litigation was deemed to be any previous litigation 
involving a patent that would benefit from the grant of vacatur that terminated prior to the 
date of the vacatur motion. 
 193. In coding the dataset, “concurrent” litigation was deemed to be parallel litigation 
involving a patent that would benefit from the grant of vacatur that was pending at the time 
the vacatur motion was filed. Member cases in a consolidated action were counted as 
“concurrent” litigation if, at the time they were initially filed (as separate suits), the same 
patent was being asserted. The total number of cases with “concurrent” litigation includes 
one case that had a concurrently-filed patent suit against the United States government in the 
Court of Federal Claims, which was mentioned in the vacatur motion in that case. (When the 
vacatur dataset was being compiled, the IPLC did not contain patent cases from the Court of 
Federal Claims.) If a suit was filed after the date of the vacatur motion but before the court 
ruled on it, such suits were coded as “concurrent.” 
 194. An unenforced, invalid patent helps to “maintain an illegitimate monopoly” for the 
patent holder without having to bring suit. Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects 
of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2006). 
Prior 
Litigation 
Concurrent 
Litigation 
14 
(17.7%) 
11 
(13.9%) 
18 
(22.8%) 
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patent as a “scarecrow,” to borrow a term from Learned Hand,195 in the supply 
chain to dissuade potential and existing customers and suppliers from using or 
supplying parts for competing products that allegedly infringe.196 As a result, the 
impact of a patentee securing vacatur of an adverse decision may have substantial 
effects on third parties beyond any potential effects on future district court 
litigation. If a patent has a history of litigation, the non-litigation effects listed 
above are likely to be greater than in cases where the patent has not been previously 
asserted or if the patentee is not known to be litigious. Yet, the data suggest that 
litigation history does not appear to be a substantial consideration when courts 
decide vacatur motions, as shown below. 
 
Table 9: Disposition of Vacatur Motion Based on 
Litigation History of Patents (# of Cases) 
Disposition 
No Litigation 
History at Time of 
Vacatur Motion 
N=36 (% of 36) 
Prior/Concurrent 
Litigation at Time of 
Vacatur Motion 
N=43 (% of 43) 
Vacatur Granted 30 (83.3%) 32 (74.4%) 
Vacatur Denied 5 (13.9%) 10 (23.3%) 
Motion Withdrawn 1 (2.8%) 1 (2.3%) 
 
There is no statistically significant difference in vacatur grant rates (83.3% 
versus 74.4%) between cases involving patents having no history of litigation 
compared to those that do.197 The similarity in grant rates further illustrates the 
heavy bias of the courts toward facilitating settlement, despite the greater 
likelihood of potential ripple effects in both litigation and non-litigation contexts 
posed by patents with a history of litigation. 
Indeed, even when the same patent was being litigated in parallel before a 
different judge at the time the vacatur motion was filed, vacatur was still granted in 
an overwhelming majority of cases, as shown in the table below. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.) (“We 
have disposed of the patent as a whole because it has seemed to us proper that it should not 
remain in the art as a scarecrow.”). 
 196. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 194, at 125–26. 
 197. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.415. 
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Table 10: Existence of Concurrent Litigation Handled by Other Judges 
and Disposition of Vacatur Motion (# of Cases) 
Disposition 
Patents NOT Involved in 
Concurrent Litigation 
Before Other Judges 
N=61 (% of 61) 
Patents Involved in 
Concurrent Litigation 
Before Other Judges 
N=18 (% of 18) 
Vacatur Granted 49 (80.3%) 13 (72.2%) 
Vacatur Denied 10 (16.4%) 5 (27.8%) 
Motion Withdrawn 2 (3.3%) 0 
 
There is no statistically significant difference in the rate of granting vacatur 
(80.3% versus 72.2%) as a function of whether the same patent is being 
concurrently litigated before a different judge.198 The marginal difference in grant 
rates further supports the inference that district courts are effectively prioritizing 
near-term docket relief above overall judicial economy and comity. As discussed 
previously, vacating an otherwise non-defective ruling for no reason other than to 
facilitate settlement can be highly disruptive to other courts, especially when they 
must, in turn, vacate their own decisions that had relied on according collateral 
estoppel effect to that earlier—now vacated—ruling.199 The goals of judicial 
economy and comity may be better served if otherwise non-defective rulings are 
never vacated if concurrent litigation exists in other courts. 
Turning now to relitigation, the data reveal that a disproportionate number of 
additional suits filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion involve patents with a 
history of litigation.200 
As of January 9, 2012, the patents implicated by the vacatur motions filed in 17 
out of 79 cases in the dataset (21.5%) were involved in a total of 60 additional suits 
filed after the court issued a ruling on the vacatur motion. The data on subsequent 
suits will necessarily be underreported and incomplete because a patentee may 
decide to wait years before filing another suit, which may occur at any time up to 
six years after a patent’s expiration date.201 
As summarized in the tables below, of the 60 additional cases that were filed 
after the courts ruled on the vacatur motions, 54 cases (90%) involved patents that 
had a history of litigation at the time the vacatur motion was filed. The following 
tables summarize the numerical relationships in the dataset relating to the 
grant/denial of vacatur, whether the case involves a patent with a history of 
litigation, and the aggregate number of subsequent cases filed after the ruling on 
the vacatur motion. Because additional suits were filed even when vacatur was 
denied, separate tables were prepared for the granted and denied cases.202 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.519. 
 199. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 200. See infra Tables 11a and 11b. 
 201. See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006). 
 202. As of January 9, 2012, none of the patents associated with the 2 cases where the 
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Table 11a: Relationship Between Litigation History and Subsequent 
Litigation After Vacatur GRANTED 
Cases Involving 
Patents with— 
Vacatur 
Granted  
N=62 
Cases Whose 
Patents Were Not 
Subsequently  
Litigated 
N=47 
Cases Whose 
Patents Were 
Subsequently  
Litigated 
N=15 
New Cases 
Filed After 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=56 
Prior/Concurrent 
Litigation at 
Time of Motion 
32 
19 out of 32 
(59.4%) 
13 out of 32 
(40.6%) 
50 
No Litigation 
History at Time 
of Motion 
30 
28 out of 30 
(93.3%) 
2 out of 30 
(6.7%) 
6 
 
 
 
Table 11b: Relationship Between Litigation History and Subsequent 
Litigation After Vacatur DENIED 
Cases Involving 
Patents with— 
Vacatur 
Denied  
N=15 
Cases Whose 
Patents Were Not 
Subsequently  
Litigated 
N=13 
Cases Whose 
Patents Were 
Subsequently 
Litigated 
N=2 
New Cases 
Filed After 
Vacatur 
Denied 
N=4 
Prior/Concurrent 
Litigation at 
Time of Motion 
10 
8 out of 10 
(80%) 
2 out of 10 
(20%) 
4 
No Litigation 
History at Time 
of Motion 
5 
5 out of 5 
(100%) 
0 out of 5 
(0%) 
0 
 
Comparing Tables 11a and 11b at a high level, when vacatur was granted in 62 
cases, the patents associated with 15 of those cases (24.2%; 15 out of 62) were 
asserted in 56 new suits (3.7 subsequent suits per case), whereas when vacatur was 
denied in 15 cases, the patents associated with 2 of those cases (13.3%; 2 out of 15) 
were asserted in only 4 new suits (2 subsequent suits per case). These statistics 
suggest that (1) the patents associated with only a fraction of the cases in which 
vacatur is requested may be involved in subsequent suits, (2) when those patents 
are relitigated, multiple assertions are likely; and (3) the denial of vacatur does not 
necessarily prevent subsequent suits, but it may dampen their frequency. 
                                                                                                                 
vacatur motion was withdrawn were involved in subsequent litigation. 
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Looking more closely at Table 11a, the number of cases where vacatur was 
granted is substantially similar between the cases involving patents with a history 
of litigation compared to those cases with patents that were being asserted for the 
first time (32 versus 30, out of 62 cases). However, the difference in relitigation 
rates of the patents associated with these two groups of cases is striking (40.6% 
versus 6.7%). This difference is highly statistically significant.203 In addition, 
looking at Table 11b, only the patents having a history of litigation were relitigated 
when vacatur was denied. 
Because more than half of the cases in the dataset involve patents with a history 
of litigation—and the patents associated with only a fraction of those cases are 
relitigated—we will also need to look at the characteristics of the patentee and the 
technology in order to further refine the criteria for spotting cases with patents that 
have a high likelihood of relitigation. This will be discussed in the remainder of 
Part IV.E. 
2. Patentee Type  
If a certain type of patentee has a reputation for litigiousness, would this prompt 
courts to deny vacatur for that type of patentee more often than others? According 
to the dataset, the answer is, surprisingly, “no.” To analyze the possible effect of 
patentee type on the grant of vacatur and relitigation, the patentees in the vacatur 
dataset were classified into three groups—practicing company, patent assertion 
entity (PAE), and individual—as follows:204 
 
(1) Practicing Company: A patentee was classified as a “practicing company” 
if it was primarily engaged in the production or sale of goods and services. 
In addition, companies whose primary focus is not production but the 
active development of new technologies through substantial research and 
development (R&D) activity were also classified as “practicing 
companies.”  
 
(2) Patent Assertion Entity (PAE): A patentee was classified as a “patent 
assertion entity” if it had no presence on the Internet except in connection 
with patent litigation-related webpages or is a company (which may be a 
subsidiary of a practicing company) whose primary focus is the litigation 
or licensing (that is, monetization) of patents.   
 
(3) Individuals: If an individual sued in his or her own name, then the patentee 
was classified as an “individual.” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.002. 
 204. The three classifications are largely modeled after those defined in Colleen V. 
Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 314 n.209 (2011), with certain 
modifications for purposes of the vacatur dataset. The patentee classification was based on 
the first-named plaintiff (or defendant in a declaratory judgment action) listed in the caption 
of the vacatur motion or the associated order (if the motion itself was unavailable). Foreign 
entities were classified using the same criteria as domestic entities. None of the first-named 
patentees in the dataset were universities. 
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The table below summarizes the number of patentee types and the associated 
vacatur grant rate and relitigation statistics: 
 
Table 12: Vacatur Grant and Relitigation by Patentee Type 
Patentee Type 
Cases in 
Dataset 
N=79 
(% of 79) 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=62 
Cases Whose 
Patents Were 
Subsequently 
Litigated 
N=17 
New Cases  
Filed After 
Vacatur Ruling 
N=60 
(% of 60) 
Practicing 
Company 
59 
(74.7%) 
45 out of 59 
(76.3%) 
9 out of 59 
(15.3%) 
41 
(68.3%) 
Patent Assertion 
Entity (PAE) 
15 
(19%) 
14 out of 15 
(93.3%) 
8 out of 15 
(53.3%) 
19 
(31.7%) 
Individual 
5 
(6.3%) 
3 out of 5 
(60%) 
0 out of 5 
(0%) 
0 
 
A substantial majority of the patentees who requested vacatur were practicing 
companies (74.7%), followed by PAEs (19%) and individuals (6.3%). Notably, the 
vacatur grant rate is the highest for PAEs (93.3%; 14 out of 15 cases), followed by 
practicing companies (76.3%; 45 out of 59 cases), and individuals (60%; 3 out of 5 
cases).205 That the patents206 in more than half of the PAE cases in the dataset 
(53.3%; 8 out of 15 cases) were involved in subsequent litigation is unsurprising 
given the PAE business model of asserting the same patents against numerous 
parties.207 The difference in the relitigation rate of patents from PAE cases 
compared to that of practicing companies (53.3% versus 15.3%) is highly 
statistically significant.208 Indeed, although PAE cases constituted only 19% of the 
dataset (15 out of 79 cases), the patents from those cases were involved in 31.7% of 
the new suits (19 out of 60 cases) filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion, as 
shown below. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. The difference in grant rates for PAE cases versus non-PAE cases, while substantial, 
is not statistically significant: using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.17. 
 206. That is, patents that would have benefitted from the grant of vacatur. 
 207. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or 
Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 
(2009) [hereinafter Allison et al., Extreme Value] (observing that PAEs “account for only 
about 16% of the once-litigated patents, [but] represent over 80% of the suits filed involving 
the most-litigated patents and own more than 50% of the most-litigated patents themselves”). 
 208. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.004. 
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Figure 2: Patentee Type in Dataset and New Cases Filed After Ruling on 
Vacatur Motion (Relative Percentages) 
 
 
That courts granted vacatur in PAE cases at a rate higher than in any other type 
of case in the dataset appears counterintuitive because the availability of collateral 
estoppel will have the greatest utility against PAE patents—which have a high 
likelihood of relitigation—and vacatur was an express condition of settlement in, at 
most, 4 out of the 15 PAE cases in the dataset.209 One possible explanation for the 
willingness of courts to grant vacatur in PAE cases may be grounded in the 
perception that PAEs, after an adverse ruling on an issue of patent liability, may be 
more willing to continue litigation through appeal than other types of patentees. For 
example, a PAE does not produce any products, such that, unlike a practicing 
company, it will not be subject to counterclaims for infringement that can be used 
as leverage for settlement. In addition, PAEs, whose primary sources of revenue are 
royalties and settlement payments, are often represented on a contingency basis, 
such that they have a strong incentive to appeal any adverse ruling that might 
foreclose the recovery of damages or settlement payments in other suits. 
Granting settlement-related vacatur when the patentee is known to be litigious 
might provide a court with near-term docket relief; however, as discussed further in 
Part IV.E.4, long-term judicial economy and the public interest may be better 
served if vacatur were denied in such cases. 
3. Technology Area 
To evaluate whether any relationships might exist between the type of 
technology, the grant of settlement-related vacatur, and relitigation, each case in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 209. In the 15 PAE cases, the vacatur motions in 2 cases contained an express statement 
of conditionality, and in the 2 other cases, a formal motion was not filed such that 
conditionality could not be determined. 
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dataset was assigned to one of six technical categories210 based on the subject 
matter of the patents that would benefit from the grant of vacatur. The six 
categories were defined as follows: 
 
(1) Pharmaceutical: Chemicals for treating medical conditions, and methods 
for developing, manufacturing, using, or administering the same. 
 
(2) Semiconductor: Semiconductor circuits/devices, and equipment and 
methods for designing, testing, and fabricating the same. 
 
(3) Computer, Electronics, and Software (CES): Hybrid category covering 
inventions where underlying technology that is primary focus of claim 
scope is directed to computers, electronics, software, or combination 
thereof. 
 
(4) Medical: Inventions related to treating or diagnosing medical conditions, 
as well as inventions for conducting medical research. This category 
excludes pharmaceuticals. 
 
(5) Mechanical: Inventions relating primarily to manufacturing, configuring, 
or using mechanical devices or parts, or key aspect of the invention 
involves use of mechanical devices or parts. 
 
(6) Other: Inventions that do not fall into categories listed above. 
 
The table below tallies the number of cases in each technology area and 
summarizes their dispositions and relitigation statistics. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. The categories were defined specifically for this Article in light of the inadequacies 
of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s classification system, as noted by other scholars. 
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000) (“[W]e did not find 
[the PTO classification system] particularly reliable. . . . [W]e came upon numerous 
instances of what appear to us to be wrong or arbitrary classification decisions. . . . [T]he 
PTO system groups together technologies that may have very different characteristics.”). 
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Table 13: Vacatur Grant and Relitigation by Technology Area 
Technology Area 
Cases in 
Dataset 
N=79 
(% of 79) 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=62 
Cases Whose 
Patents Were 
Subsequently 
Litigated 
N=17 
New Cases 
Filed After 
Vacatur 
Ruling 
N=60 
(% of 60) 
Pharmaceutical 5 (6.3%) 
3 out of 5 
(60%) 
4 out of 5 
(80%) 
19 
(31.7%) 
Semiconductor 5 (6.3%) 
3 out of 5 
(60%) 
2 out of 5 
(40%) 
8 
(13.3%) 
Computer, Elecs., 
and Software (CES) 
32 
(40.5%) 
27 out of 32 
(84.4%) 
8 out of 32 
(25%) 
20 
(33.3%) 
Medical 7 (8.9%) 
5 out of 7 
(71.4%) 
2 out of 7 
(28.6%) 
5 
(8.3%) 
Mechanical 20 (25.3%) 
15 out of 20 
(75%) 
1 out of 20 
(5%) 
8 
(13.3%) 
Other 10 (12.7%) 
9 out of 10 
(90%) 
0 out of 10 
(0%) 0 
 
At one end of the spectrum, the CES cases form the largest group in the dataset 
at 40.5% (32 out of 79 cases), whereas at the other end, the pharmaceutical and 
semiconductor cases each constitute only 6.3% (5 out of 79 cases). The patents 
relating to mechanical and “other” cases appear the least likely to be relitigated. 
The one case out of 20 mechanical cases whose patent was subsequently litigated in 
8 new cases appears to be an outlier, as mechanical patents tend to be litigated only 
once.211 The figure below provides a graphical comparison of the relative 
percentages of the technology areas represented in the cases in the dataset with 
those of the new cases that were filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. See Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 207, at 18 (“Mechanical inventions 
make up only 8% of the most-litigated patents, but 53% of the once-litigated patents . . . .”). 
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Figure 3: Technology Areas of Dataset Cases and New Cases Filed After 
Ruling on Vacatur Motion (Relative Percentages) 
 
 
Although pharmaceutical cases were only 6.3% of the cases in the vacatur 
dataset, they constituted 31.7% (19 out of 60) of the new cases filed after the court 
ruled on the vacatur motion. Also notable is the number of new semiconductor 
cases filed out of proportion to their number in the dataset (6.3% in the dataset; 
13.3% of new cases) because semiconductor patents are not usually involved in 
repeat litigation.212 
The pharmaceutical cases and the CES cases together constitute the majority of 
the subsequent suits (65%; 39 out of 60 cases), which is consistent with prior 
research reporting that these two types of cases are disproportionately prone to 
repeat litigation.213 This is unsurprising given the considerable size of the product 
markets associated with those technologies and the numerous potential accused 
infringers. This suggests that the preservation of potential collateral estoppel effect 
for the rulings in the pharmaceutical cases and the CES cases may have a greater 
beneficial impact on overall judicial economy and the public interest than in other 
types of cases where the likelihood of relitigation is low. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. See Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 207, at 20 (“Notably absent from this 
list [of most-litigated patents] is the semiconductor industry . . . .”); see also John R. Allison, 
Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 
435, 474 (2004) (“While semiconductor patents constitute a substantial fraction of all patents 
issued, they are far less likely to be litigated than any other type of patent. Only 8.2% of the 
semiconductor patents in our sample study were litigated, compared with 24.3% of the 
nonsemiconductor patents.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 213. Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 207, at 18–20. 
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4. Synthesis of Patent Characteristics and Likelihood of Relitigation 
In the preceding sections, the patentee types and technology areas represented in 
the vacatur dataset were evaluated separately. A matrix of the patentees and 
technologies may provide additional analytical granularity, as provided below for 
the 79 cases in the vacatur dataset (Table 14a), as well as the 60 subsequent cases 
that were filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion (Table 14b): 
 
Table 14a: Patentee Types and Technology Areas 
in Dataset (# of Cases; % of 79) 
Technology Area 
Practicing 
Company 
N=59 
Patent Assertion 
Entity (PAE) 
N=15 
Individual 
N=5 
Pharmaceutical (N=5) 5  (6.3%) 0 0 
Semiconductor (N=5) 4  (5.1%) 1  (1.3%) 0 
Computer, Elecs., and 
Software (CES) (N=32) 16  (20.3%) 13  (16.5%) 3  (3.8%) 
Medical (N=7) 7  (8.9%) 0 0 
Mechanical (N=20) 18  (22.8%) 0 2  (2.5%) 
Other (N=10) 9  (11.4%) 1  (1.3%) 0 
 
 
Table 14b: Patentee Types and Technology Areas 
in Subsequent Cases (# of Cases; % of 60) 
Technology Area 
Practicing 
Company 
N=41 
Patent Assertion 
Entity (PAE) 
N=19 
Individual 
N=0 
Pharmaceutical (N=19) 19  (31.7%) 0 0 
Semiconductor (N=8) 7  (11.7%) 1  (1.7%) 0 
Computer, Elecs., and 
Software (CES) (N=20) 2  (3.3%) 18  (30%) 0 
Medical (N=5) 5  (8.3%) 0 0 
Mechanical (N=8) 8  (13.3%) 0 0 
Other (N=0) 0 0 0 
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Comparing Tables 14a and 14b, it is notable that pharmaceutical cases brought 
by practicing companies and CES cases brought by PAEs together account for only 
22.8% of the vacatur dataset but 61.7% of the subsequent suits. In addition, the 
number of CES cases in which vacatur motions were filed is similar for practicing 
companies and PAEs (16 versus 13, Table 14a), but the subsequent CES cases 
overwhelmingly involve PAEs (2 versus 18, Table 14b). This difference is highly 
statistically significant.214 A comparison of the top five case types in Tables 14a 
and 14b is provided below, with the differences bolded: 
 
Table 15: Top 5 Technology-Patentee Combinations 
Vacatur Dataset (% of 79) Subsequent Cases (% of 60) 
1. Mechanical / Practicing Co. (22.8%) 1. Pharmaceutical / Practicing Co. (31.7%) 
2. CES / Practicing Co.  (20.3%) 2. CES / PAE (30%) 
3. CES / PAE (16.5%) 3. Mechanical / Practicing Co (13.3%) 
4. Other / Practicing Co. (11.4%) 4. Semiconductor / Practicing Co. (11.7%) 
5. Medical / Practicing Co. (8.9%) 5. Medical / Practicing Co. (8.3%) 
 
The data suggest that a patentee for whom litigation against potential infringers 
is critical to its business, such as PAEs and pharmaceutical companies, will likely 
reassert its patents after the ruling on the vacatur motion, even if it is denied.215 
Where the factors point to a high likelihood of relitigation, denying vacatur to 
preserve collateral estoppel effect may ultimately yield greater benefits to judicial 
economy and the public interest than granting vacatur, not only because of the 
benefits of collateral estoppel and finality, but also because the most-litigated 
patents also tend to be the weakest, prevailing only 10.7% of the time if litigated to 
judgment.216 For example, patents asserted by PAEs, also known in the literature as 
“non-practicing entities” (NPEs), win only 9.2% of the time.217 Similarly, in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.002. 
 215. The 2 cases in the dataset whose patents were asserted in 4 new cases despite the 
denial of vacatur, see supra Table 11b, involved a PAE and a pharmaceutical company. 
 216. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement 
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 680 (2011) [hereinafter Allison et al., 
Repeat Litigants] (“[T]he most-litigated patents that go to judgment are far more likely to be 
held invalid or not infringed. . . . Once-litigated patents win in court almost 50% of the time, 
while the most-litigated—and putatively most valuable—patents win in court only 10.7% of 
the time.”). 
 217. Id. at 680–81 (“NPEs [non-practicing entities] and software patentees 
overwhelmingly lose their cases, even with patents that they litigate again and again. 
Software patentees win only 12.9% of their cases, while NPEs win only 9.2%.”). 
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pharmaceutical patent litigation, a study by the Federal Trade Commission found 
that patentees lost to generic companies 73% of the time between 1992 and 2000.218 
For some courts, the potential judicial economy arising from collateral estoppel 
may be more immediate and direct: 30% of the new cases (18 out of 60) were filed 
in the same district court where the prior (dataset) case was filed, and a clear 
majority of those new cases (77.8%; 14 out of 18) that were filed in the same 
district was eventually assigned to the same judge who granted vacatur in the prior 
(dataset) case. One possible reason why a patentee may file subsequent suits in the 
same district is that the patentee believes that there is a high likelihood of being 
assigned to the same judge who is both familiar with the technology and has shown 
a willingness to grant settlement-related motions for vacatur. Indeed, as discussed 
previously,219 if a judge develops a reputation for reliably granting vacatur—which 
is becoming easier to establish unwittingly, given the advances in legal informatics 
that allow the systematic review of every docket item in every patent case for a 
specific judge—then patentees whose cases are assigned to that judge may attempt 
to adopt a “roll the dice” litigation strategy, where the prospect of guaranteed 
vacatur may lead them to take a wait-and-see approach that prolongs litigation in a 
weak case. For this reason, denying settlement-related vacatur, especially where the 
patentee is a repeat litigant, would be beneficial not only for long-term judicial 
economy and the public interest, but also for efficient near-term case management. 
F. Availability of Intervention 
As previously discussed,220 intervention is expected to be rare in the vacatur 
dataset. The results confirm this: motions to intervene were filed in only 4 out of 
the 79 cases in the dataset (5.1%) for the purpose of opposing vacatur.221 In 3 of 
those 4 cases, the potential intervenor was adverse to the patentee in a parallel 
action involving at least one of the patents that would benefit from the grant of 
vacatur. Intervention was allowed in only one of the 4 cases, and in that one case, 
the court ultimately granted vacatur.222 The rarity of intervention motions is striking 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Special Committee 
on Aging of the United States Senate on Barriers to Generic Entry: Hearing Before the S. 
Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenate07202006.p
df (“The [Federal Trade] Commission studied all patent litigation initiated between 1992 and 
2000 between brand-name drug manufacturers and Paragraph IV generic challengers, and 
found that the generics prevailed in cases involving 73 percent of the challenged drug 
products.” (footnote omitted)). 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 177. 
 220. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 221. In the dataset, there were also 3 cases in which objections to the vacatur motion 
were lodged without an attempt to intervene: in 2 cases, the court provided an opportunity 
for the non-settling parties in related or consolidated cases to object, and, in the remaining 
case, a third party filed an objection without attempting to intervene. 
 222. The intervenor appealed the grant of vacatur, but voluntarily dismissed its appeal 
after settling with the patentee. Order, CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-
BR (D. Or. Oct. 1, 2009), ECF No. 934 (dismissal of appeal); Appellants 
ApplicationsOnline, LLC’s and The Common Application, Inc.’s Statement of Issues for 
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given that 43 out of the 79 cases (54.4%) in the dataset involve patents with a 
history of litigation (prior or concurrent or both) that would benefit from the 
vacatur of certain adverse decisions.223 A patent with a history of litigation is likely 
to have third parties who would be concerned about its scope, validity, and 
enforcement issues in light of the patentee’s litigiousness—yet, motions to 
intervene were filed in only 4 cases in the dataset. 
Possible factors that may contribute to the scarcity of intervention motions may 
include timing and notice issues that make it difficult for third parties to timely file 
them. The table below summarizes the average and median number of days it takes 
a court to rule on a vacatur motion in the dataset, as measured between the date of 
the motion224 and the date of the ruling:225 
 
Table 16: Time Between Filing of Motion 
and Ruling on Vacatur (in days) 
 
Cases226 with Ruling 
on Vacatur Motion 
N=77 
Vacatur 
Granted 
N=62 
Vacatur 
Denied 
N=15 
Range 
(Low/High) 
0 / 333 0 / 245 1 / 333 
Average 25 19 48 
Median 4 4 11 
Std. Dev. 57 43 93 
 
In the dataset, courts decided vacatur motions, on average, 25 days after they 
were filed. However, as shown in Table 16, this average appears to be heavily 
skewed by outliers. A more telling statistic is the median number of days. In 
approximately half of the cases where vacatur was granted (35 out of 62), the court 
issued its decision within 4 days. Notably, 22.6% of the decisions granting vacatur 
(14 out of 62) were issued at a pace that gave third parties less than a day to object 
prior to the court’s decision: in 8 cases, the motion was granted the same day it was 
filed, and in 6 cases, the court granted vacatur without a formal written motion 
                                                                                                                 
Appeal at 2–3, CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. July 10, 
2009), ECF No. 932 (issues appealed). As a result, an opportunity was lost for the Federal 
Circuit to directly consider the merits of a district court’s decision to grant settlement-related 
vacatur. 
 223. See supra Part IV.E.1. 
 224. The date of the vacatur motion was calculated as described at supra note 137. 
 225. The date of the ruling used to calculate the elapsed time is the date the judge signed 
the ruling, not when the ruling was posted to PACER. Also, if the district court provided an 
indicative (or tentative) ruling and subsequently issued a formal order, the date coded was 
that of the formal order. 
 226. This does not include the 2 cases where the motion was withdrawn. 
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having been filed beforehand, such that the first indication in the docket of the 
parties’ intent to seek vacatur was the order granting it.227 
The alacrity with which vacatur motions are typically granted may ultimately 
impair the ability of third parties to timely move to intervene prior to the court’s 
ruling. Furthermore, because cases are often closed or dismissed the same day or 
shortly after vacatur is granted, it may be difficult for third parties to file a motion 
to intervene before the case has terminated, let alone before the grant of vacatur.228 
Even if potential intervenors were to monitor the docket constantly, they may 
nevertheless be prevented from filing timely motions to intervene because of a 
failure of notice arising from vacatur motions that are not fully accessible to the 
public. In 9 out of 79 cases (11.4%) in the dataset, the contents of the vacatur 
motion—or even its existence—were obscured from the public when the parties 
initially requested vacatur. In 3 of those cases, the earliest document that provided 
notice of the parties’ intent to move for vacatur was filed under seal.229 In the 
remaining 6 cases, a written motion does not appear to have been filed, as indicated 
by the absence of any corresponding PACER docket entry, which suggests that 
those motions were raised during a hearing or a conference with the court, which 
are often held off-the-record if settlement is discussed.230 In such cases, a potential 
intervenor would not be aware of the existence of a request for vacatur until the 
court entered a ruling on the motion, at which point, it may be too late to intervene. 
The courts granted vacatur in 8 out of these 9 cases with notice issues. 
Even in the absence of timing and notice issues, a timely motion for intervention 
is not likely to be granted. As previously noted, the preservation of collateral 
estoppel effect is not presently a basis for granting intervention as of right, and 
courts may be reluctant to grant permissive intervention when settlement is near.231 
Indeed, 3 of the 4 intervention motions filed in the dataset were timely, yet 
intervention was granted in only a single case. The table below summarizes the 
conditions under which the intervention motions were filed and decided in those 4 
cases, labeled A through D: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 227. If no motion was filed, the time between the motion and the vacatur ruling was 
coded as zero days. 
 228. Intervention motions filed post-judgment or after dismissal—other than to request 
access to documents sealed under a protective order—are strongly disfavored. 6 MOORE, 
supra note 35, at §§ 24.11, 24.21. 
 229. In coding whether a motion was filed under seal, the status of only the cover motion 
and any supporting memorandum of law was considered. The status of the declarations, 
exhibits, or other attachments was not considered, because those items are routinely filed 
under seal. 
 230. See, e.g., Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 2, at 25 (“[T]he meetings or 
conferences at which judges may encourage settlement tend to occur out of public view and 
off the record, thereby sheltering the judge’s actions from scrutiny and eliminating the 
protections afforded in formal proceedings.” (footnote omitted)); Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, supra note 6, at 402 n.115 (“Because most pretrial conferences are off the record, 
little documentation is available.”). 
 231. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
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Table 17: Disposition of Intervention Motions Filed in Dataset (4 Total) 
Case 
Time Between 
Vacatur 
Motion and 
Intervention 
Motion 
(in days) 
Intervention 
Motion Filed 
Before or 
After Court 
Ruled on 
Vacatur 
Motion? 
Are Patentee  
and Potential 
Intervenor 
Directly Adverse 
re: Patents 
Affected by 
Vacatur? 
Intervention 
Granted or 
Denied? 
Vacatur 
Ruling 
A232 11 After 
Yes (Adversarial 
Negotiation and 
Arbitration) 
Denied Granted 
B233 7 Before 
Yes (Concurrent 
Litigation) 
Denied, but  
amicus 
briefs 
allowed 
Denied 
C234 1 Before 
Yes (Concurrent 
Litigation) 
Dismissed 
as moot 
after 
vacatur 
denial  
Denied 
D235 7 Before 
Yes (Concurrent 
Litigation) 
Granted Granted 
 
In short, the predominant manner in which district courts currently handle 
vacatur motions appears to introduce timing and notice issues that inhibit the timely 
filing of motions to intervene, which, when coupled with the courts’ reluctance to 
grant permissive intervention when the parties are negotiating settlement, can 
create an environment where “[t]here will be no opposing voice when the parties 
move for vacatur,”236 as noted by Judge Moore. To ameliorate this situation, district 
                                                                                                                 
 
 232. Agere Sys. Inc. v. Atmel Corp., No. 2:02-cv-00864-LDD (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2006), 
ECF No. 435 (motion to intervene by Rohm Company, Ltd., filed under seal). That the 
patentee, Agere, and the potential intervenor, Rohm, were likely engaged in adversarial 
negotiations around the time of the intervention attempt, and were subsequently involved in 
arbitration, was revealed in a complaint that Agere later filed at the International Trade 
Commission to assert one of the patents that benefitted from the grant of vacatur. See 
Complaint at 35 ¶ 106, Certain Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Using Tungsten 
Metallization & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-648 (Apr. 18, 2008). 
 233. Infineon Techs. N. Am. Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Inc., No. 5:02-cv-05772-JF (N.D. 
Cal. July 31, 2006), ECF No. 116 (motion to intervene by Micron Technology, Inc.). 
 234.  Avid Identification Sys. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:04-cv-00183-TJW 
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008), ECF No. 462 (motion to intervene by Allflex USA, Inc.). 
 235. CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. May 1, 2009), ECF 
No. 917 (motion to intervene by ApplicationsOnline, LLC and The Common Application, 
Inc.). 
 236. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376 n.1 (Moore, J., 
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courts could consider the following options, which have already been used in some 
cases in the dataset: 
 
(1) To provide an adequate opportunity for third parties to weigh in on the 
potential impact of vacatur, the court could establish a briefing window 
during which third parties may move to intervene or, alternatively, file 
amicus briefs.237  
 
(2) To avoid notice issues, the court could require the entire motion for 
vacatur and its supporting documents—including the settlement 
agreement—to be publicly filed without redactions.238 If the parties are 
using as a bargaining chip the potential preclusive effect of an otherwise 
non-defective ruling that was created through the expenditure of public 
funds, then the public should be allowed to review the terms of the 
settlement agreement that was negotiated with that bargaining chip. 
Prohibiting the filing of vacatur motions under seal may also have the 
salutary effect of discouraging parties from seeking such relief.239 
 
To the extent that providing an adequate opportunity for notice and objection by 
third parties could discourage some settlements, it would affect primarily those 
cases where the parties are attempting to use settlement-related vacatur as a 
substitute for appeal, for which the equitable remedy of vacatur is inappropriate.240 
                                                                                                                 
concurring). 
 237. Examples from the dataset: Scheduling Order, CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 
3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2009), ECF No. 913; and Civil Minutes, Infineon Techs. 
N. Am. Corp. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., No. 5:02-cv-05772 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2006), ECF No. 
111. 
 238. Example from the dataset: Order, PBI Performance Prods., Inc. v. Norfab Corp., No. 
2:05-cv-04836-HB (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2008), ECF No. 117 (order unsealing joint motion for 
vacatur). The joint motion for vacatur in this case included the settlement agreement as an 
attachment. Joint Motion for Vacatur of the August 29, 2007 Order Invalidating U.S. Patent 
No. 6,624,096 for Obviousness at 10, PBI Performance Prods., Inc. v. Norfab Corp., No. 
2:05-cv-04836-HB (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2008), ECF No. 113-1. 
 239. In one case in the dataset, the parties withdrew their vacatur motion after the court 
ordered them to justify their motion as well as their request to seal. See Assented-To Motion 
to Withdraw Pending Motions, Skyline Software Sys., Inc. v. Keyhole Corp., No. 06-cv-
10980 (D. Mass. Feb. 11, 2008), ECF No. 95 (withdrawal of vacatur motion); Procedural 
Order, Skyline Software Sys., Inc. v. Keyhole Corp., No. 06-cv-10980 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 
2008), ECF No. 93 (order requesting justification to seal). 
 240. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994); see 
also 12 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 60.48[1] (“In fact, the courts always require that there be 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying relief [under Rule 60(b)(6)]. To read the provisions 
otherwise would permit the discretion vested in a court by Rule 60(b) to be used to make 
unnecessary inroads into judgments that would otherwise be final, or to transform Rule 60(b) 
into a substitute for appeals.” (citations omitted)). 
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Persuasive Precedent is Not Enough 
The data suggest that granting settlement-related vacatur is a false economy. As 
discussed throughout Part IV, district courts appear to be prioritizing near-term 
case management by granting motions for settlement-related vacatur even when it 
could undermine overall judicial economy and adversely affect the interests of the 
public at large. For cases involving repeat litigants, the benefits that may accrue 
from denying vacatur and preserving the preclusive effect of a ruling outweigh the 
incremental additional work involved in continued litigation through appeal, 
especially since the most-litigated patents are often weak and have a higher-than-
average loss rate if litigated to judgment.241 
Some may question, however, whether settlement-related vacatur is truly a 
cause for concern in view of the fact that a vacated ruling typically remains 
accessible to the public, other litigants, and other courts via PACER and electronic 
databases (for example, Lexis and Westlaw), such that a vacated ruling that is 
stripped of any preclusive effect may still be used as persuasive precedent. There 
are several reasons why the availability of persuasive precedent does not obviate 
the need to curtail the practice of settlement-related vacatur. 
First, the fact that a ruling has been vacated may embolden patentees to 
continue to assert patents that may be weak and, at the same time, potentially 
discourage accused infringers from challenging dubious claims of infringement in 
view of the prospect of having to litigate without the potential benefit of collateral 
estoppel against a patentee who also has an informational advantage by virtue of 
having tested his major theories in a prior case. As previously noted, 93.3% of the 
new cases (56 out of 60) filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion involved 
patents associated with cases where vacatur was granted.242 Because the denial of 
vacatur may discourage the reassertion of weak patents and marginal claims of 
infringement, vacatur should generally be denied, including those cases where the 
patentee makes it an express condition of settlement.243 
Second, if a later court declines to accord collateral estoppel effect to a prior 
ruling, and treats it instead as persuasive precedent, that prior ruling may be given 
greater persuasive weight if it remained “intact” than if it were vacated. This is 
because the reason for vacatur is not always apparent.244 As the data show, vacatur 
is granted usually without any reasoned explanation,245 such that other courts may 
not be able to discern the degree to which the prior court was confident in its 
ruling.246 In some cases, it is possible that the court granted vacatur, in part, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 241. See supra notes 216–218. 
 242. See supra Tables 11a and 11b. 
 243. See supra Part IV.D. 
 244. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 2, at 630 (“Although a vacated decision may remain in 
the case reporters, its precedential value is extremely limited. . . . A litigant citing a vacated 
decision cannot be sure that the court did not vacate based on second thoughts about the 
legitimacy of the legal rulings.” (footnote omitted)). 
 245. See supra Part IV.B. 
 246. Professor Jill Fisch suggests that “[c]ourts could resolve this problem by stating 
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because it had doubts about its ruling in light of the popular perception that the 
claim construction reversal rate is “too high.”247 Alternatively, the court might have 
been extremely confident in its ruling but granted vacatur for the sole purpose of 
facilitating settlement. Accordingly, in the absence of any substantive explanation 
of the reasons for granting vacatur, later courts might accord a vacated ruling less 
persuasive weight than it might otherwise deserve. 
Third, the vacated ruling may not always remain accessible for use as persuasive 
precedent. In particular, the parties might request—as a further condition of 
settlement—that the court also order the removal of the vacated rulings from Lexis 
and Westlaw,248 and also from the court’s electronic docket so that those rulings are 
no longer available on PACER.249 That some courts have in recent years250 ordered 
the removal of electronic versions of vacated rulings raises concerns as to how far 
courts would be willing to go to fulfill the conditions of the parties’ settlement 
agreements. In addition, if courts were to routinely accord substantial persuasive 
weight to vacated rulings, the next logical step in the evolution of the joint motion 
for vacatur could be the inclusion of a provision whereby the settlement is 
contingent on the court issuing an opinion actively disavowing and criticizing the 
vacated ruling, so as to substantially weaken any persuasive value that it may have. 
Motions for settlement-related vacatur are, accordingly, a cause for concern in view 
of their potential for manipulation of judicial proceedings and the public record. 
More generally, settlement-related motions for vacatur have the “look and feel” 
of collusion and cartel-like behavior:251 the once-opposing parties jointly seek 
vacatur of an adverse ruling so as to resurrect a patent that may be asserted against 
                                                                                                                 
explicitly the grounds for vacatur whenever they grant a motion to vacate . . . .” Fisch, supra 
note 2, at 630 n.211. 
 247. E.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2007) (“[C]omputing claim 
construction reversal rates has been a popular sport: numerous studies have reported claim 
construction reversal rates from about 25% to 50%. Based on these statistics, the notion that 
the reversal rate is ‘too high’ has become firmly ingrained in the minds of commentators, 
practitioners, and judges alike . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). In the dataset, the de novo review 
of claim construction rulings was mentioned in at least 5 vacatur motions and in one of the 
few orders where the court provided a reasoned analysis of its decision to grant vacatur. 
 248. See, e.g., Order, Klein v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 2:04-cv-00955 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 6, 2009), ECF No. 225 (granting vacatur and ordering removal of rulings from Lexis 
and Westlaw). In Klein, a personal injury case filed against Amtrak, the confidential 
settlement included a provision that called for the vacatur of certain published opinions and 
their removal from Lexis and Westlaw. Shannon P. Duffy, After Settlement, Opinions Erased 
in Amtrak Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 19, 2009, at 1 (“[A] spokeswoman for 
Westlaw, said [the judge’s] request to remove the opinions would ‘absolutely’ be honored, 
and that any instance in which a judge vacates a published opinion automatically leads to its 
withdrawal from Westlaw’s database. Calls to Lexis were not returned by press time.”). 
 249. See, e.g., Docket Entry Text, SourceOne Global Partners, LLC v. KGK Synergize, 
Inc., No. 1:08-cv-07403 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 165 (“The agreed joint motion to 
vacate . . . is granted . . . . [M]emorandum opinion and order (doc. # 117) is hereby vacated; 
the Clerk of the Court is instructed to remove that memorandum opinion and order, and the 
accompanying minute order (doc. # 116), from the docket.”). 
 250. See supra notes 248–249. 
 251. The author thanks Mark Lemley for this point. 
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others in the industry. Although the grant of vacatur is a judicial act, the mere 
involvement of a court in connection with a settlement may not necessarily 
eliminate potential antitrust issues (a prime example being “reverse payment” 
agreements in pharmaceutical patent cases).252 Future research could investigate the 
antitrust implications of settlement-related vacatur in greater depth. 
B. Appellate Considerations 
Curtailing settlement-related vacatur may be difficult to accomplish without 
further guidance from the Federal Circuit that clarifies the standards for evaluating 
motions to vacate at the district court level. In particular, Bancorp should be 
formally extended to the district courts in a precedential Federal Circuit opinion. In 
addition to a clear pronouncement that “exceptional circumstances” do not include 
the mere fact that the parties have settled and are forgoing appeal, specific guidance 
on what does and does not constitute “exceptional circumstances” is needed in 
view of the data revealing that district courts are routinely vacating final judgments 
despite the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement of Rule 60(b)(6).253 To 
discourage gaming by the parties, the Bancorp standard should be further extended 
to interlocutory orders, rather than being limited to final judgments, since any 
impact on judicial economy arising from vacatur before or after the entry of 
judgment is largely one of degree.254 The formal extension of Bancorp to the 
district courts is long overdue and is a step that some district courts have already 
taken by applying the principles from Bancorp to deny vacatur of final decisions255 
as well as interlocutory rulings.256 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. Cf. Mark L. Kovner, Colin R. Kass & Avery W. Gardiner, Applying the Noerr 
Doctrine to Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 609, 629 n.54 
(2003) (“[T]he fact that a settlement is ‘so ordered’ does not necessarily save it from 
antitrust liability.”). 
 253. See supra Parts IV.A.2, B. 
 254. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316, 318 (E.D. Wis. 
2001) (“In terms of judicial economy, the difference between vacatur after judgment and 
vacatur before judgment, but after a Markman hearing and order, is only one of degree.”). 
 255. See, e.g., Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2-06-cv-78, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10109, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (“[T]he parties have failed to show an 
equitable entitlement to an ‘extraordinary remedy’ of vacatur. The only reason 
presented . . . is that the parties have entered into a settlement agreement. Granting a 
vacatur . . . would effectively result in the exact same relief that Bancorp holds is 
inappropriate.”); Order, PBI Performance Prods. Inc. v. Norfab Corp., No. 2:05-cv-04836 
(E.D. Pa. June 25, 2008), ECF No. 115, at 1 (citing Bancorp in denying vacatur). 
 256. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley, 199 F.R.D. at 320 (“[The] claim construction order, like 
nearly all court decisions and orders, affects interests beyond those of the parties in the 
present action. The benefits of settling the present action are, in short, outweighed by the 
systemic costs that would be incurred by vacating the court’s order.”); Zinus, Inc. v. 
Simmons Bedding Co., No C 07-3012 PVT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33359, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 23, 2008) (“[T]he court entertained several rounds of briefing, . . . heard an hour of oral 
argument, and spent several days drafting the [summary judgment] opinion. The public paid 
for this use of court resources through its tax dollars. Vacatur would render that expenditure 
a waste . . . .”). 
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Any doctrinal changes adopted by the Federal Circuit that are intended to 
restrict the practice of settlement-related vacatur may be more effective if the 
Federal Circuit’s Mediation Guidelines were also updated to support that objective. 
If the Circuit Mediators are suggesting the filing of vacatur motions during 
mediation sessions, this could potentially send mixed messages to litigants and 
district courts as to whether settlement-related vacatur is somehow being condoned 
by the Federal Circuit. Although, as a matter of official court policy, the Federal 
Circuit and its Appellate Mediation Program take no position on whether such 
motions should be granted,257 the very fact that a Circuit Mediator had suggested 
the vacatur motion could nevertheless make that motion appear more legitimate or 
compelling than may be warranted by the circumstances. For example, over a year 
after issuing the precedential order in Ohio Willow Wood, the Federal Circuit 
remanded a case258 to allow the parties to jointly move the district court to vacate 
an invalidity ruling. At the district court, third parties objected to the vacatur 
motion,259 and the patentee—a PAE—emphasized in its briefing that the Chief 
Circuit Mediator had suggested moving to vacate the invalidity ruling in order to 
facilitate settlement.260 The district court granted vacatur.261 
Finally, the fact that the Federal Circuit has not yet had an opportunity to 
consider the merits of a district court’s decision to grant vacatur is symptomatic of 
the high barrier to intervention by third-party objectors, as discussed previously.262 
At the appellate level, this barrier is further heightened by the Federal Circuit 
whenever it adopts a rigid, narrow reading of the applicable regional circuit law in 
evaluating the timeliness of an intervention motion.263 Whether a motion to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 257. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 258. Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 849 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 
13, 2012). 
 259. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae Profitstreams, LLC, Ameranth, 
Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271-DF (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4. 2011), ECF No. 333; 
Motion by Non-Party Seamless N. Am., LLC for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, 
Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271-DF (E.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2011), 
ECF No. 334. 
 260. On remand in Ameranth, the patentee stressed the Chief Circuit Mediator’s role in 
suggesting the vacatur motion that targeted the invalidity decision:  
  The public interest in resources expended by this Court and by the 
Federal Circuit would be respected by vacatur of the invalidity verdicts and 
judgment . . . . The Federal Circuit’s objectives would also be respected 
since the settlement would not have been reached without the efforts of the 
Chief Federal Circuit Mediator and his suggestion of the motion for 
vacatur to facilitate the settlement. 
Plaintiff Ameranth’s Opposition to Non-Party Seamless N. Am., LLC’s Motion for Leave to 
File Amicus Curiae Brief at 10–11, Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271-
DF (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 336 (emphasis added). 
 261. Order, Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 
2012), ECF No. 355 (granting vacatur). 
 262. See supra Part IV.F. 
 263. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns, 418 F.3d 1217, 1222, 1224 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (reversing district court’s grant of intervention because “[third-party objector’s] 
motion to intervene failed to satisfy the Fifth Circuit requirement that there be an existing 
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intervene is timely is not an inquiry that can be satisfied by bright-line rules.264 
Accordingly, when evaluating the timeliness of an intervention motion filed to 
oppose the grant of settlement-related vacatur, the Federal Circuit should also 
consider the broader context of whether the public had adequate notice and an 
opportunity to timely intervene. 
CONCLUSION 
The grant of settlement-related motions for vacatur is presently the rule rather 
than the exception in patent cases at the district court level. Where the decision 
targeted for vacatur relates to the scope, validity, or enforceability of a patent, 
granting vacatur may be a false economy. This is especially the case when, as the 
data reveal, most courts are granting vacatur summarily265 without regard to the 
litigation history of the patent;266 the litigiousness of the patentee;267 whether the 
targeted ruling is final or interlocutory;268 the existence of concurrent proceedings 
involving the same patent;269 or whether third parties have adequate notice and an 
opportunity to object.270 In addition, settlement-related vacatur does not appear to 
substantially change the timing of settlements271 or case duration272 at the district 
court level; rather, it appears to function primarily as a bargaining chip during 
settlement negotiations.273 
The district courts’ willingness to grant vacatur leaves the judiciary vulnerable 
to strategic behavior274 and manipulation275 by litigants—especially repeat 
players—and burdens the public with the anticompetitive effects of weak 
patents.276 For this reason, settlement-related vacatur of any rulings affecting patent 
liability issues should be denied in the absence of “exceptional circumstances.”277 
                                                                                                                 
suit in which to intervene” and, on that basis, deeming it unnecessary to reach merits of 
district court’s vacatur ruling). 
 264. In general, courts evaluate the following four factors to determine timeliness: 
(1)  The length of time the intervenor knew or should have known of 
its interest in the case before moving to intervene;  
(2)  The prejudice to the original parties, if intervention is granted, 
resulting from the intervenor’s delay in making its motion to intervene; 
(3)  Prejudice to the intervenor if the motion is denied; and 
(4)  Any unusual circumstances mitigating for or against a 
determination that the motion is timely. 
6 MOORE, supra note 35, § 24.21. 
 265. See supra Part IV.B. 
 266. See supra Part IV.E.1. 
 267. See supra Part IV.E.2. 
 268. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 269. See supra Part IV.E.1. 
 270. See supra Part IV.F. 
 271. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra Table 7. 
 273. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra text accompanying note 219. 
 275. See supra notes 248–250 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 215–218 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra text accompanying notes 253–256. 
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In short, a patentee who miscalculates his chances of prevailing and fails to settle 
prior to the issuance of an adverse ruling should not be allowed to escape the 
consequences of that ruling at the public’s expense. 
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APPENDIX A: IPLC SEARCH PARAMETERS 
To find the relevant cases, the following search parameters were used to gather 
an initial list of docket entries that were individually reviewed to identify each case 
in which a settlement-related vacatur motion was filed that satisfied the subject 
matter and time period restrictions of the vacatur dataset: 
 
Search Keywords: vacat* 
Case Type: patents 
None of these words: reset reexamination “briefing schedule” “status 
conference” “markman hearing” “construction hearing” usca “case 
management conference” transfer “early neutral evaluation” “patent-
term” “administrative order” unseal compel discovery “pro hac vice” 
limine default consolidating pretrial answer reply surreply response 
opposition “docket control order” “referring motion” “referring case to” 
“show cause” “scheduling conference” “initial disclosures” “protective 
order” “scheduling order” cmc rescheduled 
Event Date Range: 01/01/2006 to 01/03/2011 
 
If the relevance of a specific docket entry was not clear, the corresponding 
document was retrieved and reviewed. Documents not available on the IPLC were 
downloaded from PACER. The terms for the “None of these words” filter were 
chosen primarily to exclude the numerous items vacated in a typical case that relate 
to scheduling or administrative issues. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: WESTLAW SEARCH PARAMETERS 
In Westlaw, three databases were searched for case documents that might 
indicate that a settlement-related motion for vacatur was filed in the associated 
case: U.S. District Court Cases (DCT), Andrews Patent Litigation Reporter Court 
Documents (ANPATLR-DOC), and Federal Civil Trial Filings (FED-FILING-
ALL). The following search string was used: 
(VACAT! /P SETTLE!) & (PATENT! NONINFRING! INVALID! “CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION” MARKMAN) & da(aft 12/31/2005 & bef 1/4/2011) % 
(HABEAS CONVICT! EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYEE! EMPLOYER! 
PRISON! “CLASS ACTION” “STATE LAW” ARREST! INSURANCE) 
 
For each document in the search result that appears to have been filed in a patent 
case in which a settlement-related motion for vacatur was filed, the associated 
docket was reviewed on the IPLC or PACER (or both) to determine whether the 
vacatur motion satisfied the subject matter and time restrictions of the vacatur 
database. 
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APPENDIX C: DOCKET NAVIGATOR SEARCH PARAMETERS 
In Docket Navigator, the following search parameters were used to find court 
orders that might indicate that a settlement-related motion for vacatur was filed in 
the associated case:  
 
Search 1: 
Type of Information: Court documents 
Posture of Motion: Stipulated/Agreed OR Motion to Vacate 
Document Text: vacat  
 
Search 2: 
Type of Information: Court documents 
Type of Court Document: Motion to Vacate Prior Order 
 
Search 3: 
Type of Information: Court documents 
Legal Issue: Vacating Judgment/Order 
 
For each document in the search result that appears to have been filed in 
connection with a settlement-related motion for vacatur, the associated docket was 
reviewed in Docket Navigator or PACER (or both) to determine whether the 
vacatur motion satisfied the subject matter and time restrictions of the vacatur 
database. 
  
